THE JOHN MARSHALL
REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

THE GLOBAL PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: SEARCHING FOR THE
MINIMUM CONSENSUS
AMAN GEBRU
ABSTRACT
The protection of traditional knowledge (TK) – the know-how, skills, innovations and practices of indigenous
peoples and local communities has been a subject of heated debate in many international forums. TK has proved
to be useful as an input in modern industries. For instance, pharmaceutical companies have used medicinal TK
to develop drugs more quickly. Despite its value, TK faces an alarming rate of loss and there are many initiatives
that attempt to preserve it for posterity. However, almost every major issue on TK protection is contentious,
including whether international TK protection is necessary or if domestic legislation alone would suffice to
preserve the knowledge from loss. Many countries in the Global-South who tend to hold the lion’s share of TK
have enacted a domestic TK protection regime, while most countries in the Global-North, in which most firm that
use TK reside, have little TK protection. Following from this state of affairs, there is a considerable gap in
negotiating positions; and the most advanced instrument on TK protection (the Draft Articles on TK protection)
is far from becoming a guideline, let alone a binding treaty.
This paper argues that negotiators should seek the minimum consensus among like-minded countries to develop
a binding international instrument for TK protection and leave the rest of the issues to be addressed through
domestic legislation. There is a need to strike a balance between providing flexibilities for domestic jurisdictions
to craft domestic laws based on its context, and ensuring that there is sufficient international obligation that
would encourage the preservation and dissemination of TK. Such a framework should begin with the minimum
consensus among key stakeholders including source communities/countries and countries in which major TK
users reside. The paper proposes the adoption of five key articles that any international TK protection regime
should adopt. These are: 1) a provision defining TK and the general subject matter that should be subject to
protection; 2) an article requiring the establishment of domestic frameworks that would encourage the codification
and disclosure of TK through databases/registries; 3) an article setting out enforcement measures; 4) provisions
on national treatment and MFN treatment; and 5) a provision on the relationship of the instrument to other
international agreements. Since many jurisdictions seem to accept such requirements, the international TK
protection regime should adopt these provisions and allow policy makers to adopt a fitting domestic framework
for their jurisdictions.
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THE MINIMUM CONSENSUS
AMAN GEBRU *
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. A local community of hunters in a remote desert
in Southern Africa uses parts of a certain plant to help them suppress their appetite.
They chew on the roots of the plant which makes them feel full and they can walk for
long distances in search of wild animals to hunt. An anthropologist researching
communities in the area hears this practice from one of the members of the community.
She decides to document the practice by interviewing the elders who know most about
the practice. She then takes some samples of the plant back to her university in the
US. She gives the samples and her notes to a scientist who works for a big
multinational company that produces weight loss products. After years of research the
scientist manages to extract the active ingredient found in the plant. He then
convinces his employer to apply for a patent over the appetite suppressant qualities of
the active ingredient and to start the regulatory approval process for the weight loss
drug. The company is granted a patent and begins the regulatory approval process.
When the patenting of the active ingredient is disclosed to the public, many activists
for indigenous rights protest against the lack of recognition for the contribution of the
local community. The company argues it has no legal obligation to recognize the
community’s contribution. However, the activists manage to organize a successful
campaign which pressures the company to recognize the local community as the source
of the knowledge and promises to share 5% of the profits from the sale of the weight
loss product. 1
The above story sounds familiar to anyone who follows discussions surrounding
bio-piracy – the patenting of inventions that are based on traditional knowledge
without the consent or knowledge of the source community. Traditional knowledge
(“TK”) – the know-how, skills, innovations and practices of indigenous peoples and
local communities has been the subject of heated debate on the international stage. 2
* © Aman Gebru 2017. Visiting Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. The author acknowledges the financial support of the Hauser Global Post-doctoral
Fellowship, (New York University School of Law), the Center for Innovation Law and Policy (Univ. of
Toronto) and the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). He is grateful for many
scholars including Ariel Katz, Michael Trebilcock, Mariana Mota Prado, Ruth Okediji, Kerry Rittich,
Rochelle Dreyfuss, Tesh Dagne, Chidi Oguamanam and Bassem Awad for their valuable comments
on earlier versions of this paper. While many people have contributed in the development of this
paper, any shortcomings should be attributed to me.
1 For a detailed historical account of five major examples from Africa, See ABENA DOVE
AGYEPOMA OSSEO-ASARE, BITTER ROOTS: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING PLANTS IN AFRICA (2014).
2 A detailed analysis of the debate surrounding the definition of the term ‘traditional knowledge’
and other key terms is outside the scope of this paper. However, it is essential to note here that the
definition of key terms in the literature is highly controversial. Some indigenous peoples and local
communities disagree with the definitions, and consider the process by which outsiders define terms
as a continuation of the oppression and dominance of colonial powers. Some scholars prefer to adopt
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The term ‘indigenous peoples’ refers to communities living in countries where settler
communities reside, and the term ‘local communities’ is used to refer to communities
that reside in countries from which colonizing powers have left, but in which the
community is still secluded from the mainstream society. 3 In the international debate,
the term protection is used two ways. In the defensive sense, protection is used to
mean the disclosure of TK to invalidate claims of intellectual property ownership by
outsiders through unauthorized means. In the positive sense, protection means the
granting of positive rights to source communities to control the use of their TK by
outsiders.
The use of TK by outsiders created a clash of world views in which users (which
include for profit firms, research institutions and individuals) access TK without the
consent or knowledge of source communities. TK proved to be valuable for outsiders
when used as an input in modern industries. 4 A good example is the use of traditional
medicinal knowledge in the modern drug discovery process. Since traditional
medicinal knowledge (“TMK”) seems to be the most commonly used knowledge in the
discussion around TK protection, this paper will focus on such type of knowledge.
However, the discussions will have implications for other types of traditional
knowledge. 5
In one research, the use of TMK increased the chances of getting a preliminary
hit 6 in plant screening from 6% to 25%. 7 Another research revealed the predictive role
that TMK plays in drug discovery. 8 However, there is little in the way of a legal
obligation or business practice that requires firms to recognize the contribution of TK
in the drug discovery process. Despite this value, TK is being lost at an alarming rate.
For instance, research by Victoria Reyes-Garcia and her colleagues revealed that,
a broad definition that takes the cultural and environmental context of traditional knowledge when
defining the term. The definition adopted in this paper is a narrow one. This is done in order to
provide a detailed analysis of a concise area and because the narrow definition seems to be the one
adopted in many of the international deliberations taking place on TK protection.
3 For a detailed discussion of the debates around definitions related to TK, see Chidi Oguamanam,
International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Plant Biodiversity, and
Traditional Medicine, (2nd ed., 2006) at 3 & 23.
4 TK is useful independently. Members of the source community use this knowledge in their daily
lives and customary rules and practices govern the use of such knowledge. This, however, is not the
focus of this paper. The paper will focus on the use of TK as an input in modern industries, which at
times results in creating tension between the source community and users, making it a complex
relationship for governance.
5 The literature informally divides TK into different fields including traditional medicinal
knowledge
(TMK),
traditional
agricultural
knowledge
(TAK),
and
traditional
ecological/environmental knowledge (TEK).
6 “Preliminary hit” is the compound that is selected from a large number of compounds as a result
of its phenotype or process which is relevant for the disease being researched. The compound would
still have to go through validation and other tests in the drug discovery process. Benoit Deprez &
Rebecca Deprez-Poulain (Guest Editor: Benoit Deprez and Rebecca Deprez-Poulain), Hit-to-Lead:
Driving Forces for the Medicinal Chemist, 4:6 CURR. TOP MED. CHEM. i (2004); Rebecca DeprezPoulain & Benoit Deprez, Facts, figures and trends in lead generation, 4:6 CURR. TOP MED. CHEM. 569
(2004).
7 Michael Balick, Ethnobotany and the identification of therapeutic agents from the rainforest, D
J CHADWICK & J MARSH, EDS, BIOACT COMPD PLANTS, 22 (1990).
8 C Haris Saslis-Lagoudakis et al, Phylogenies Reveal Predictive Power of Traditional Medicine
in Bioprospecting, 109:39 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 15835 (2012).
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between the years 2000 – 2009, the loss of TK related to the use of plants among
Tsimane` Amerindians (an Amazonian community) ranged “from 9% (for the female
subsample) to 26% (for the subsample of people living close to towns).” 9 The
researchers identified that TK loss is higher in communities living closer to cities than
in remote villages. Given this dramatic rate of TK loss, many experts have called for
the establishment of a legal regime to save TK from loss and to regulate its use by
outsiders. There is a diversity of views in how to regulate the use of TK and the debate
is as divided as it has ever been. The rationales for TK protection and domestic
frameworks are outside the purview of this paper. However, an organizing principle
seems to be the need to save TK from the alarming rate of loss it is faced with. As
argued elsewhere, the need to encourage the codification and disclosure of TK should
be a core goal for any TK protection regime. 10 Legal frameworks should be established
with the goal of encouraging public/private investment in the codification and
disclosure of TK. This would save TK from loss and it would help in facilitating the
relationship between source communities and TK users. While this paper does not
restate the arguments here, it does consider the codification and disclosure of TK as
one of the key factors in its analysis.
This paper is interested in examining international TK protection. In this context,
one of the key debates is whether there is a need for an international legal framework
for TK protection, or if it is sufficient for interested countries to enact domestic
legislation protecting TK. While the consensus seems to be that some sort of
international protection is necessary, experts disagree on what form this international
approach should take. Thus, this paper will begin by considering whether domestic
TK protection would suffice to properly regulate the use and dissemination of TK, or if
an international mechanism is needed. It outlines domestic measures that could be
adopted to mitigate some of the challenges that the TK protection could face in the
absence of international protection, but it acknowledges the need for an international
framework to fully realize the global welfare-improving potential of TK.
This paper analyzes the international instruments and institutions discussing TK
protection - the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), the Convention on
Biological Diversity (“CBD”) and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Following
these introductory sections, this paper will examine, in detail, the deliberation of the
Draft Articles for TK protection at the WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(“IGC”). The Draft Articles document reflects an advanced discussion of TK protection,
and it is unique in expressly encouraging TK codification. Four key issues of
contention that delegates have continued to debate will be examined in this regard.
Noting the stalled process of deliberations on the Draft Articles instrument, the
paper then examines the minimum substantive standards that should be adopted at
the international level to facilitate the cross-border use of TK. In this context, a few
promising proposals that could provide an efficient international protection for TK are
analyzed. The ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement received special attention in recent
Victoria Reyes-García et al, Evidence of Traditional Knowledge Loss Among a Contemporary
Indigenous Society, 34:4 EVOL. HUM BEHAV. OFF J HUM BEHAV. EVOL. SOC. 249 (2013).
10 See generally, Aman Gebru, International Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge: From Cultural Conservation to Knowledge Codification, 15 ASPER. REV INT.
BUS TRADE LAW (2015).
9
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deliberations on international TK protection, including at the WIPO IGC. The
requirement obligates patent applicants to disclose the origin of TK used in the process
of developing a claimed invention. Another promising proposal is the international
recognition of national laws. This proposal will also have significant implications for
solving some of the challenges that domestic systems will face. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the potentials and challenges of using Free Trade Agreements
(“FTAs”) to establish international norms for TK protection.
II. IS INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NECESSARY?
TK is a global public good that crosses local and national borders. It is a nonexcludable good in that those who invest in the codification and disclosure of TK would
have a hard time excluding users to have not paid to access it. Therefore, there is a
risk of extra-territorial free-riding, i.e. there is a risk that firms in countries that do
not have domestic TK protection systems could use the TK codified in a jurisdiction
that provides protection. If country A established a TK protection mechanism and as
a result, a robust TK database, firms in country B, a jurisdiction that does not
recognize TK protection, could access the TK database in country A without being
bound by country A’s protection mechanism. This may discourage country B and other
jurisdictions from adopting TK protection mechanisms in order to allow firms in their
jurisdictions to free-ride on TK codification in country A. Firms in country B, which
will not have to share profits with TK holders, would have the advantage of low
production cost over firms in country A, which has to share profits. This may
discourage country A from adopting a TK protection mechanism in the first place. This
risk of extra-territorial free-riding brings up the question of whether there is a need
for international protection or if domestic protection would suffice to provide an
effective TK protection. The implication of territoriality of rights is consequential
because of the non-excludable nature of TK and the fact that it does not require an
advanced level of expertise to copy or to understand the knowledge.
One way to respond to the risk of extra-territorial free-riding is to argue that if
the major users of TK adopt the proposed sui generis 11 system, there could be sufficient
incentive to codify and disclose the knowledge, even if not all countries in the world
adopt it. If most developed countries in which most users of TK reside adopt the
proposed sui generis framework within their domestic systems, the need for
international protection will be reduced. Researchers and firms in developed countries
could be required to abide by domestic rules if they use TK from abroad. Domestic
laws could also be recognized in international instruments (a proposal discussed later
in this paper). If TK holders (or their licensees) can recoup their investments on TK
codification and disclosure from the jurisdictions that provide protection, they might
continue to invest in such endeavors despite the lack of protection in some countries.

11 The term ‘sui generis’ is a Latin term meaning “of its own kind”. “The term is used in
intellectual-property law to describe a regime designed to protect rights that fall outside the
traditional patent, trademark, copyright, and trade-secret doctrines.” Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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However, most key jurisdictions in the Global North, including those with
considerable indigenous populations, have not adopted a TK protection mechanism.
Almost all domestic legislation 12 and all regional frameworks 13 on the TK protection
are in countries and regions that seem to be net exporters of TK and genetic resources.
Furthermore, such response to extra-territorial free-riding may not adequately
address the situation described above where firms in countries that do not protect TK
could have an advantage over firms in countries that do protect it. This risk might
convince countries to avoid protecting TK, ultimately challenging the effectiveness of
the regime.
Another way to respond to the problem of free-riding on the international stage is
to either make the codified TK confidential or defer its public disclosure. Making
codified TK confidential for a limited amount of time would give applicants in the sui
generis system lead time that could support them in recouping the investments they
make in codifying and disclosing TK. Competing firms in other countries would not be
able to free-ride on the knowledge for at least some period of time. This delayed access
might, in turn, encourage countries to establish TK protection mechanisms in order to
gain preferred access to it. It should be noted here that countries that have many
indigenous peoples and local communities would have an incentive to establish a
system of protection for self-serving reasons.
There are current practices of deferred disclosure upon which such claims could
be based. Under the patent laws of some developed countries, patent applications are
not disclosed to the public immediately. For instance, in the US and Canada, patent
applications are published to the public 18 months after the application date. 14 Within
this confidentiality period, the patent application and documents submitted with the
application are not accessible to the general public. In the wider academic research
community, although the priority is to make research reports freely accessible, there
is the culture of putting embargoes on research reports in exceptional circumstances. 15
The purpose of deferred disclosure seems to be to protect the inventor or author of the
knowledge from unfair competition with others who might use the disclosed
knowledge. A similar argument for deferred disclosure can be made in the case of TK
disclosure.
If confidentiality and deferred disclosure mechanisms are adopted, at least some
of the risks associated with extra-territorial free-riding will be addressed. The
competition to get preferred access to TK could be sufficient incentive to induce
12
WIPO
LEX
SEARCH
(QUERY:
TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE
(TK),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results.jsp?countries=&cat_id=18 (A search query for “Traditional
Knowledge” in the WIPO Lex (a search engine for relevant legislations) lists domestic legislations
relevant for TK).
13 Regional initiatives related to TK include the Andean Community, the African Union and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Property in Global
Governance: A Development Question, Routledge Research in Intellectual Property, New York, USA:
Routledge, 161 (2012).
14 For the US see 35 U.S.C. 122 (2017); for Canada see An Act Respecting Patents of Invention,
RSC 1985 C P-4 (2017).
15 Office of the Governing Council, University of Toronto Publication Policy, UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO (2007) (In addition to some restrictions on publications by faculty and staff, graduate
student are also able to put a temporary embargoes to restrict a library from putting a copy of their
thesis in its database).
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countries to provide protection. However, such approach is not the optimal mechanism
because it will restrict the dissemination of valuable knowledge. Additionally, given
the ‘global public good’ nature of TK and its cross-border use, the territoriality of any
proposed TK protection could seriously undercut its effectiveness. 16 While countries of
the Global South hold the lion’s share of TK and related genetic resources, the Global
North is where the intellectual and financial capacity to exploit such resources resides.
Thus, there are major contributions that an international system of TK protection
could make.
In a workshop organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) and the Commonwealth Secretariat on national systems of
protection, delegates from various countries highlighted the need for an international
system of protection. 17 Some of the more important reasons cited for the need to
establish international protection include the need to have domestic legislation of one
country implemented in another; the need to respond to restrictions that states face
from Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPs article; 18 the need to stop the patenting of traditional
knowledge sourced from a foreign jurisdiction; and the challenges of the monitoring
and enforcement of violations in foreign countries. 19
In addition to the reasons highlighted by country representatives, scholars have
attempted to extrapolate the challenges of international protection from failed past
experience and the concerns of stakeholders. Intuitively, it seems to makes sense that
relationships between actors located in different corners of the world that cross various
jurisdictions be governed by a supra-national mechanism. As rightly noted by Jane
Anderson, an international protection mechanism could function as an “overarching
authoritative framework for negotiations” 20 for parties involved in the use of TK in a
modern industry. This may include a supra-national dispute settlement mechanism
in order to avoid the influence of politics on the relationship between stakeholders.
The unequal power that exists among countries and between TK users and knowledge
holding communities 21 is another key reason for the establishment of an international
mechanism on which such relationships could be built.
Currently, there are different international instruments and organizations
relating to the protection of TK. However, they have yet to provide clear and holistic
16 Petra Ebermann, Patents as Protection of Traditional Medical Knowledge? A Law and
Economics Approach, EUROPEAN STUDIES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, 174 (2012).
17 United National Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the UNCTADCommonwealth Secretariat Workshop on Elements of National Sui Generis Systems for the
Preservation, Protection and Promotion of Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices and
Options for an International Framework, NEW YORK AND GENEVA: UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, 19 (2005).
18 Article 27.3 (b) of the TRIPs agreement requires that jurisdictions bound by the TRIPs
agreement must provide protection for some life forms “either by patents or by an effective sui generis
system.” Delegates at the UNCTAD-Commonwealth Secretariat workshop felt that, while the
exclusion of all life forms would have been an effective tool to stop bio piracy, because Article 273 (b)
requires such protection for some life forms member countries did not have the flexibility to ban
patents on life forms. See id.
19 Id.
20 Jane Anderson, Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property, Issue Paper,
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 36 (2010).
21 Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 165.
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protection. 22 While most of the instruments have no express statement on TK
codification and disclosure, some of them consider TK codification to be a key part of
the attempt to provide TK protection. The most promising and comprehensive attempt
to protect TK is taking place in a committee of the WIPO. The ‘Draft Articles on the
protection of traditional knowledge,’ the most advanced instrument on TK protection,
is being negotiated at the WIPO. Although TK codification is not a prerequisite for
protection, the need to encourage TK codification has been highlighted in this
framework and delegates seems to have reached a consensus on the matter. Before
examining the Draft Articles, the following section outlines the various international
dialogues on TK protection, including a general overview of the process at the WIPO.
III. THE PROTECTION OF TK UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Traditional knowledge lies at the intersection of multiple issues of international
governance and is, therefore, being discussed in multiple forums. 23 It involves global
public health issues because a considerable portion of the world’s population relies on
TK and its exploitation could impact the health of a significant portion of the world’s
population. 24 A considerable proportion of drugs are produced from genetic resources
so TK discussions have implications for both biodiversity conservation and
environmental protection. 25 The uses of TK in internationally traded drugs have given
rise to discussion in trade and development circles. Given the historical and continuing
oppression of indigenous peoples and local communities, the issue also touches on the
field of human rights. Advancements in biotechnology and other technological areas,
the international pressure for the conservation of biodiversity, movements for the
recognition of indigenous peoples and local communities all have contributed to the
current state of affairs. 26 While the CBD and WTO deliberations do not specifically
refer to TK codification or disclosure, the WIPO IGC facilitated substantial discussion
focusing on the need to save TK from loss through documentation. Thus, while the
discussion in Section 3.1- 3.4 is intended to introduce the core forums for TK protection,
the implication of WIPO’s work related to TK codification and disclosure will be
examined in Section IV of this paper.

22 Miriam Latorre Quinn, Protection for Indigenous Knowledge: An International Law Analysis,
14 ST THOMAS LAW REV. 287, 307 (2001).
23 UNCTAD, Systems and National Experiences for Protecting Traditional Knowledge,
Innovations and Practices (TD/BCOM.1/EM.13/2), UNCTAD, 6 (2000).
24 See generally D S Fabricant & N R Farnsworth, The value of plants used in traditional medicine
for drug discovery, 109:SUPPL 1 ENVIRON HEALTH PERSPECT 69 (2001).
25 See generally TIMOTHY R TOMLINSON & OLAYIWOLA AKERELE, EDS, MEDICINAL PLANTS: THEIR
ROLE IN HEALTH AND BIODIVERSITY (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).
26 World Intellectual Property Organization, Background Brief No. 2 - WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION at 2.
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A. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
International discussions related to TK began in the 1960s when countries in the
Global South began calling for the recognition of the contributions of traditional
cultural expressions. 27 This movement managed to produce the WIPO-UNESCO
(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Model Provisions
for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore against Illicit
Exploitation and other Forms of Prejudicial Action in 1982. 28 The model provision
allowed countries interested in protecting folklore to voluntarily use the Model
Provisions in crafting domestic legislation. In addition to the Model Provisions, the
movement to protect folklore managed to have the rights of performers of folklore
recognized in the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. 29
However, these early discussions of the protection of folklore focused on cultural
expressions and not traditional knowledge stricto sensu as defined in the introduction
section of this paper. International discussions on the protection of TK stricto sensu
began as part of the movement for biodiversity conservation and were affected by
technological advances, especially in the biotechnology field. 30 A key instrument in this
initiative is the Convention on Biological Diversity discussed in the next section.
The work of the WIPO on the intellectual property issues in genetic resources and
traditional knowledge began in the late 1990s. 31 In preparation for the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (2000), member states of the WIPO brought the issue to the
Standing Committee on Patents and gave their first mandate for the organization to
take up issues related to TK in 1998. 32 WIPO undertook nine fact-finding missions
throughout 1998 and 1999. 33 This became an attempt to collect first-hand accounts of
the “intellectual property needs and expectations of knowledge holders” and included
consultation with indigenous peoples and local communities, governments, industry
representatives and civil societies in several countries. 34 Among other things, the factfinding mission report highlighted the need to reform existing intellectual property
laws and to work on creating new legal tools for TK protection. 35
As a result of discussions that took place around the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
member states agreed upon a need for a permanent forum to discuss issues related to
genetic resources (GR), traditional knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural
expressions (TCEs). 36 This brought together WIPO’s past work on folklore along with
the related issues of GR and TK. Thus, the establishment of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge

Id at 1.
Id.
29 See article 2 and footnote 13 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (20 Dec. 1996).
30 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 26, at 1.
31 Id at 3.
32 Id at 2.
33 World Intellectual Property Organization, Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of
Traditional Knowledge Holders, Mission Report (Geneva, 2001).
34 Id. at 7.
35 Id at 8 Executive Summary.
36 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 26, at 2.
27
28
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and Folklore (IGC) occurred in September 2000. The three key features that gave rise
to the IGC have been summarized as follows:
… First, it was established to address three new themes that shared certain
distinct features: GRs, TK and TCEs were simultaneously regarded as the
“common heritage of humanity” and as intellectual valuables requiring
appropriate forms of IP protection. Second, GRs, TK and TCEs were seen as
the intellectual assets of new key players in IP policy-making, namely
developing countries and indigenous and local communities. Third, and more
broadly, the IGC was conceived as part of a larger and structured endeavor
by WIPO to move towards a modern, responsive IP system that could
embrace non-Western forms of creativity and innovation, be comprehensive
in terms of beneficiaries, and be fully consistent with developmental and
environmental goals. 37
Although other forums have held discussions on TK protection, the IGC has been
the key international forum in this regard.
The early years of the IGC (2000 – 2004) were focused on the defensive protection
of TK. 38 After almost a decade of deliberations, member states of the WIPO decided in
2009 that the IGC should begin working towards one or more international
instruments that would govern the issues of GR, TK, and Folklore. 39 Deliberations at
the committee have at times been highly contentious. For instance, the IGC mandate
failed to be renewed in the fall of 2014. 40 However, the committee’s mandate renewed
in 2015 and it continues hosting the most advanced discussions on the protection of
traditional knowledge. 41
Various groups of like-minded countries emerged during the process of the IGC
negotiations. A general categorization of these groups shows that most developing
countries (especially those with a high concentration of biodiversity and indigenous
communities) strongly advocate the international protection of TK while most
developed countries prefer to maintain the status quo.
Insightful linguistic
anthropological research into the IGC negotiation has been conducted by Stefan
Groth. 42 After observing the IGC deliberations and personally conversing with
delegates personally on informal occasions, Groth confirms the general divide in
positions between the developing and developed countries. He clusters the member
country delegates at the IGC into ‘stalling delegates’ and ‘speeding up’ delegates to

Id.
Defensive protection of TK is the attempt to stop users of TK from claiming IP rights by
producing evidence of the existence and/or use of TK.
39
STEFAN GROTH, NEGOTIATING TRADITION: THE PRAGMATICS OF INTERNATIONAL
DELIBERATIONS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY (Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2012).
40 Catherine Saez, “US Proposes Suspension of WIPO TK Committee; Switzerland and Others
Counter”, online: Intellect Prop Watch <http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/09/11/us-proposes-suspensionof-wipo-tk-committee-switzerland-and-others-counter/>.
41 Id.
42
STEFAN GROTH, NEGOTIATING TRADITION: THE PRAGMATICS OF INTERNATIONAL
DELIBERATIONS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY (Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2012).
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describe the general orientation of the delegates participating in the negotiation. 43 The
various groups of like-minded countries include, among others, the African Group,
GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group), the Asian Group, Group B (US,
JAPAN, New Zealand, EU, and Australia), the Central European and Baltic States,
and Central Asian and East European Countries. As can be observed from negotiation
texts, developing countries with significant biodiversity resources and traditional
knowledge, and those in which a considerable number of local communities reside
(especially Brazil, India, Peru and some African countries) are strong demandeurs 44 of
TK protection.
However, Groth acknowledges that the clustering of ‘stalling’ delegates and
‘speeding up’ delegates is “an abstraction to characterize far more complex and
multilayered processes.” 45 He reveals that some developed countries may actually be
willing to agree to some form of international TK protection, while still other
developing countries may be adopting politically strategic positions by supporting likeminded countries in order to use the political capital gained from such support in other
international forums. 46 Furthermore, the demandeurs of TK protection are diverse and
include developing country governments, indigenous peoples, local communities,
NGOs, researchers, international and regional organizations. This diversity results in
a diversity of perspectives on and approaches to TK protection. The lack of a consensus
among even the demandeurs of TK protection contributed to the slow progress of the
IGC. 47
Despite the contentious deliberations, the IGC produced an important document
on TK protection – The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles [Draft

Id at 42–44.
Developing countries and countries that are rich in biodiversity are usually the actors calling
for legal protection for traditional knowledge and genetic resources. Therefore the term ‘demandeurs’
is used in the negotiations at the WIPO – IGC to refer to this loose group of countries. See DANIEL F.
ROBINSON, AHMED ABDEL-LATIF, AND PEDRO ROFFE, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE
WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 347 (2017).
45 Id. at 44.
46 Id.; Groth gives the following example to show how countries support like-minded states in
politically strategic ways. “To give an example, Egypt has a notably strong voice in WIPO IGC
negotiations on traditional knowledge and folklore. Yet, in private conversation, one high-ranking
Egyptian delegate made clear to me that his country has no interest in the protection of TK or TCEs
whatsoever – it is not on the domestic agenda, nor does it play a big role in diplomacy. Yet, in
negotiations, the Egyptian delegate makes drastic statements and demands, increasing the pressure
on the stalling delegations as much as possible. The delegate explained this position by noting that
Egypt regards the current UN system as unbalanced and disadvantageous to developing countries. So
to increase the pressure on industrialized nations, negotiation tokens from WIPO’s IGC are used to
try to bring about changes in the UN system, including in neighboring fora like the WTO or CBD.”.
47 The lack of consensus among the advocates of TK protection negatively impacted the IGC
process, and this became confirmed by delegates involved in the deliberations of the IGC in
presentations made at a workshop organized by the International Law Research Program at the
Center for International Governance Innovation on May 14, 2015 in Toronto, Canada. CIGI ILRP
Consultation Workshop, Emerging International Law Issues Related to Biodiversity, Traditional
Knowledge & Cultural Expression: From Community Knowledge to a Knowledge Community,
available
at
https://www.cigionline.org/events/cigi-ilrp-consultation-workshop-emerginginternational-law-issues-related-biodiversity-tradit (last visited Sep. 8, 2017).
43
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Articles] – which distills the deliberations of delegates over the past several years. 48
There are numerous brackets in the document showing terms on which delegates could
not agree. 49 Since these brackets are used with respect to numerous key features,
future prospects for the Draft Articles are highly unpredictable. Considerable work
needs to be done before an international instrument on which member states can agree
on is produced. Because of the high importance of this forum to the discussion in this
paper, the key issues of contention in the Draft Articles and their potential to save TK
from an alarming rate of loss is discussed in Section 4 below.
B. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
The protection of traditional knowledge in general (differentiated from cultural
expression) began as part of a larger discussion on the conservation of biodiversity
resources. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one of the first
international conventions to mention traditional knowledge. 50 It is, in fact, the only
binding international treaty to expressly call for the protection of such knowledge. 51
However, the CBD has general statements that are aspirational rather than being
enforceable on their own.
The global nature of the values of biodiversity and its alarming rate of loss spurred
talks and galvanized states to collaborate in the effort to find a global solution. Work
on the Convention began in 1988 when the UNEP’s (United Nations Environmental
Program) Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity first established. 52
As a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which included technical (legal)
and political negotiations, the Convention opened for signature at the 1992 Rio “Earth
Summit” (UN Conference on Environment and Development) and entered into force in
1993. 53
The Convention currently has 196 parties 54 and is a key instrument in the
movement for the protection of TK. 55 Before the CBD, biodiversity resources were
considered to belong to humankind in general. However, this position became
considered to be one of the causes for the alarming rate of biodiversity and TK loss.
Thus, the CBD signaled a change in perspective from one considering biodiversity and
related TK to be a ‘common heritage of mankind’ to one considering it to be something
over which source countries have rights. 56 In recognizing these rights, the preamble
48 STAFF OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 21ST IGC, THE PROTECTION OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: DRAFT ARTICLES (WO/GA/40/7).
49 See generally id.
50 UNCTAD, supra note 23, at 6.
51 Id.
52 For historical account of the Convention including the various meetings and related documents
see Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, History of the Convention, CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/history/ (last visited Sep. 7, 2017).
53 Id.
54 Notably, the United States of America has not ratified it.
55
See generally CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, LIST OF PARTIES,
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml (last visited Sep. 7, 2017).
56 See Chapter 2 The Convention on Biological Diversity, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
(Sep. 7, 2017, 2:27 PM), https://www.cbd.int/gbo1/chap-02.shtml.
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states that the “conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of
humankind” 57 displaying the change in terminology. (Emphasis added).
Despite the near universal acceptance of the core mission of conserving
biodiversity, the details of the Convention and its implementation have proved
contentious. As a result, the rights and obligations recognized in the Convention are
general and vague. For the purposes of TK protection, the key sections of the CBD
include Articles 8(j), 10 (c), 15 and 18 (4). 58
These provisions are more aspirational than substantive in that they use qualified
language including the phrases “as far as possible and as appropriate” and “subject to
national legislation.” 59 Besides, the CBD does not expressly call for the protection of
TK. The most functional of these provisions is Article 8 (j) 60 which states:
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: …
(j) Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits
arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. 61
The numerous conditions in the provision show its limitations and its vagueness.
The provision reflects some advances since it could be used to create a legal mechanism
through which knowledge holder communities and countries could share the benefits
arising from the use of their knowledge and resources. However, it permits “backward,
exploitive, and even abusive regimes to continue their practices under the banner of
‘national legislation.’” 62 The need to respond to the local context through diverse
national legislation is undeniable in every international regime. However, Article 8 (j)
seems completely dependent on the unilateral initiative of member states and on
whether they prefer to provide TK protection. The consensus after the signature of the
CBD is that it does not go far enough in calling for TK protection. 63

57 Id. at Chapter 2 The Convention on Biological Diversity, at The Objectives and Approach of the
Convention.
58 See Handbook of The Convention of Biological Diversity Including its Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety,
CONVENTION
OF
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY
3
(Sep.
7,
2017),
https://www.cbd.int/doc/handbook/cbd-hb-all-en.pdf.
59 Id. at 11, 94.
60 John Mugabe, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: An Exploration in
International Policy Disclosure, INTELLECT PROP HUM RIGHTS PANEL DISCUSS COMMEM. 50TH ANNIV.
UDHR, 116 (1998).
61 Handbook of The Convention of Biological Diversity Including its Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, at 138.
62 Curtis M Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity under Intellectual Property
Law: Toward a New International System, 10 J ENVIRON. LAW LITIG. 1, 24 (1995).
63 Mugabe, supra note 60, at 117.
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The other relevant provisions, Articles 10 (c), 15 and 18 (4), are also highly
qualified. 64 A combined reading of the articles provides a general obligation for
cooperation in the promotion and conservation of biodiversity and the ability of states
to craft systems for the sharing of benefits arising from the use of such biodiversity
resources and knowledge. All these vague and general obligations are subject to the
existence of national legislation.
On the positive side, the Convention is only a first move towards international
dialogue on the protection of biodiversity and TK protection. It functions as a
framework instrument which requires additional documents to be implemented. As
one of the steps in elaborating on the CBD, working groups and meetings of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) managed to produce two instruments: The Bonn
Guidelines (2002) 65 and the Nagoya Protocol (2010). 66
The Bonn Guidelines (on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization) are an important step in
clarifying the CBD. It is a voluntary system intended to support member countries in
developing legislation and contractual regimes for access to benefit sharing from the
use of genetic resources and TK. 67 The Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) mechanism
proved to be useful under the Guidelines. 68 Several member states, especially
developing, and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), have used the system to establish
national ABS mechanisms. 69
More importantly, for the purpose of this paper, the Guidelines fueled discussion
on the requirement of disclosure of origin of source countries/communities in
procedural and substantive patent law instruments. The disclosure of origin
requirement applies if a patent applicant, directly or indirectly, used a genetic resource
or TK in developing the invention being considered for a patent right. 70 The applicant
will be required to disclose the source country or community and it is hoped that this
mechanism would allow countries/communities to set conditions on accessing such
resources. 71 Following the inclusion of such a standard in the Bonn Guidelines, the
government of Switzerland led a successful movement to include the requirement in
the (procedural) Patent Cooperation Treaty and the (substantive) Patent Law Treaty. 72
The creative solution of requiring patent applicants to disclose relevant TK related
information, while not a comprehensive solution, is a key development in the
international dialogue on TK protection.
At the 2004 Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting of the CBD, the Ad Hoc
Open-ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-sharing mandated member states
to work on an instrument that would elaborate on Articles 8(j) on TK, and Article 15
CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 56.
CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, The Bonn Guidelines, supra note 56.
66 The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of the Convention on Biodiversity,
Introduction (Oct. 2014).
67 The Bonn Guidelines, supra note 65.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Handbook of The Convention of Biological Diversity, at 209.
71 Id.
72 Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 160. It should be noted that this is one of the few cases in which
a developed country has taken the lead in advocating for TK protection in an international forum.
64
65
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on Access and Benefit-sharing. 73 On October 29, 2010, the resulting document, the
Nagoya Protocol, became adopted, following six years of intense deliberations and
came into force on October 12, 2014. 74 The purpose of the protocol is to provide legal
certainty and clarity in implementing the CBD’s third objective – access to genetic
resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilization. 75
To make the Access and Benefit Sharing obligation effective, the protocol requires that
signatories ensure the establishment of checkpoints as compliance measures and the
availability of domestic remedies. 76
Several parts of the protocol were controversial including the binding nature of
the protocol and its implication for TK protection in general. 77 The protocol will be
binding on the states that have ratified it, 78 and this is one of the key improvements
that the protocol has brought about. Other highlights include Global Clearing-House
and Multilateral Access and Benefit Sharing mechanisms. 79 Although the protocols
recognition of customary laws of indigenous people and local communities on
biodiversity and TK is a step in the right direction, it subjects such laws to domestic
laws of signatories. 80 The protocol also defers from other international instruments
and deliberations which might reduce its capacity to address issues related to access
and benefit-sharing processes. 81 However, the protocol has only been in force for two
years. 82 Thus, analysis of its impact will have to be made at a later point once there is
sufficient time for implementation. As the latest in the international attempt to
protect genetic resources and TK, the success of the protocol will have a considerable
impact on the realization of the potential that TK holds. Since most of the user
countries have not yet ratified the protocol, there is much to be done before the
objectives of the protocol will be met.
TK protection as an independent issue is a contentious topic in Nagoya Protocol
deliberations. 83 Since the focus of the Convention and discussions has been the
conservation of biodiversity resources, TK is discussed only in so far as it relates to
this core objective. TK was not discussed as a standalone issue which seems to have
been a result of the historical development of the CBD framework. The international
discussion of TK protection as a standalone issue began at the WIPO, and the work of
The Nagoya Protocol at 1.
Id.
75 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 66.
76 Id. see art. 14, 17, 18.
77 Linda Wallbott, Franziska Wolff & Justyna Pozarowska, The Negotiations of the Nagoya
Protocol: Issues, Coalitions and Process, GLOB GOV GENET RESOUR ACCESS BENEFIT SHAR NAGOYA
PROTOC, 33 (Great Britain: Routledge, 2014).
78 There are currently 66 parties to the Protocol and 92 signatories. It is expected that all
signatories will ratify the protocol. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Parties to
the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoyaprotocol/signatories/default.shtml.
79 See generally Nagoya Protocol at 8-11.
80 Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 163.
81 See art. 4, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of the Convention on Biodiversity,
supra note 66; Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 163.
82 The Nagoya Protocol entered into force on 12 October 2014, which is 90 days after the 50th
member state deposited its ratification. See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The
73
74

Nagoya Protocol: About the Nagoya Protocol, https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml/.
83

Nagoya Protocol, supra note 81.
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the WIPO and other international forums seems to have influenced the Nagoya
Protocol negotiation process in reinforcing the need to protect TK. 84 The protocol
requires the ‘prior informed consent’ (PIC) of knowledge providers before users access
TK and a fair and equitable sharing of profits. 85 Most TK is based on plant genetic
resources. 86 Given the broad scope of the phrase ‘associated with genetic resources,’
the Protocol covers most uses of TK. 87 The protocol also requires the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits with source communities. 88
The Nagoya Protocol is an essential instrument supporting domestic protection
mechanisms. The fact that the Nagoya Protocol, as a mandatory instrument, outlines
the principles of PIC and the fair and equitable benefit sharing, makes it an
indispensable tool for the prospecting right framework, a mechanism which considers
these two principles to be a core part of the framework. Jurisdictions adopting
domestic protection should use the PIC and fair and equitable benefit-sharing
provisions of the Nagoya Protocol when crafting domestic laws.
To sum up, while the CBD is a key instrument for the TK protection discussion,
it is a general statement that requires more detailed instruments for implementation.
The Nagoya Protocol met some expectations and failed to meet others. The core
successes of the protocol includes its reiteration of the principles enshrined in the CBD
and Bonn Guidelines; its inclusion of advances made in supporting the recognition of
the rights of knowledge holders and, more concretely, its establishment of compliance
measures such as checkpoints which are essential for enforceable access and benefit
sharing mechanisms. 89 The protocols shortcomings include its vagueness, 90 the fact
that it subjects recognition of customary laws to the laws of domestic jurisdictions, and
its express deference to other international instruments. 91 The Bonn Guidelines and
the Nagoya Protocol are essential concepts and strategies to support domestic legal
frameworks. These instruments provide for the disclosure of origin requirements, the
principles of PIC, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits.
An important and contentious issue that the Protocol failed to address is the
interplay between the CBD framework and the global protection of intellectual
property covered under the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. 92 Before discussing this ambiguity it is appropriate to
examine the approach of the WTO-governed TRIPs agreement to the protection of TK.

Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 163.
The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing of the Convention on Biodiversity, supra
note 66 at, art. 5 (5).
86 Id. at 3.
87 Id.
88 Id. at art. 5, 6, 7.
89 Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 163.
90 The International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development called the Protocol “a
Masterpiece of Ambiguity.” See International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, CBD
Clinches
ABS
Protocol
in
Nagoya,
ICTSD
BIORES,
http://www.ictsd.org/bridgesnews/biores/news/cbd-clinches-abs-protocol-in-nagoya.
91 Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 163.
92 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
84
85
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The following section discusses TRIPs and how it relates to TK protection followed by
a description of the tension between the CBD and the TRIPs regimes.
C. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement which forms
part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement is the instrument that
outlines the intellectual property rights and obligations of member countries. 93 It
represents the first time that an international treaty provided a “floor for protection in
all major areas of [intellectual property rights] and a ceiling for anti-intellectual
property right measures.” 94 The TRIPs agreement may be the most controversial area
of the WTO system. One of the points of criticism is that it is seen by many as serving
the interests of the Global North (or, particularly, IP exporting states) and limiting the
policy space for countries in the Global South to consider local contexts. 95 This
criticism is acutely evident in the global public health discussions and, more
particularly, in the access to medicine debate. 96
TK, which is dominant in countries of the Global South, is not recognized under
the TRIPs agreement. There is a “profound silence around the protection of indigenous
and traditional knowledge” in the agreement. 97 It is arguable that TK protection
established by a member state in its domestic legal system would be TRIPs-Plus (i.e.
a right granted in addition to the baseline protection under the agreement) or outside
of TRIPs. 98 If TK protection is TRIPs-Plus, member countries could establish
protection under their domestic jurisdiction so long as such protection does not
encroach on their TRIPs obligations. If, however, TK protection is outside the TRIPs
agreement, then it does not need to be bound by some of the TRIPs terms such as
national treatment. 99 The expressed wish of countries from the Global South includes
TK protection as an integral part of the obligation under the TRIPs Agreement or
agreements of similar scope. In response, developed countries seem to have engaged
in a ‘regime-shifting’ strategy by remitting TK protection discussions to the WIPO. 100
If developing countries succeed in including TK protection under the TRIPs regime,
the framework of protection would benefit from the strong WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.
To this effect, some scholars have suggested ways in which the TRIPs agreement
could be made to accommodate TK protection. For instance Silke von Lewinsky points
TRIPS Agreement, art. 1.
Horton, supra note 62, at 25.
95 Id.
96 See generally C M Correa, Health and intellectual property rights, 79:5 Bull World Health
Organ. 381 (2001).
97 Anderson, supra note 20, at 39.
98 Susy Frankel, Attempts to Protect Indigenous Culture through Free Trade Agreements,
Christoph B Garber, Karolina Kuprecht & Jessica C Lai, eds, INT TRADE INDIG CULT HERIT, 134
(2011).
99 Id. at 134–135.
100 GROTH, supra note 42, at 44; CHIDI OGUAMANAM, PRESSURING ‘SUSPECT ORTHODOXY’:
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE PATENT SYSTEM, 322 (Matthew Rimmer, ed, Edward Elgar
Publishing 2016) (2016).
93
94
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to Article 39 on ‘the protection of know-how’ as the most promising area for considering
TK protection under TRIPs. 101 Jane Anderson points to the protection of Geographical
Indications as a feasible, though limited, route for deliberation on TK protection under
TRIPs. 102 However, the protection available under both proposals will be limited to the
protection of TK meeting the strict requirements of patent laws such as novelty
(newness) and inventive step (non-obviousness). 103 Most TK does not fulfill the core
requirements of patent laws. Therefore, attempts to protect TK under TRIPs will
require major reforms that would disrupt the IP system significantly.
In addition to scholarly attempts at interpreting the TRIPs agreement or
reforming it, indigenous peoples and developing countries have been pushing for
similar reform in diplomatic circles. For instance, a group of several indigenous
peoples published the ‘Seattle Declaration’ at the 3rd WTO ministerial meeting in
November, 1999 criticizing the TRIPs Agreement for, among other things, facilitating
abuse of their knowledge and for failing to extend protection to TK. 104 The declaration
criticized the WTO for recognizing only ‘western’ knowledge systems and called on the
organization to stop the unauthorized patenting of TK and explore alternative ways of
protecting it. 105 Despite these and many other attempts at interpreting the TRIPs
agreement and calling for the inclusion of TK protection, the agreement as it stands
does not provide TK protection. 106
Some member states of the WTO, mostly developing countries, 107 have added their
voices to the TK protection movement and pushed for the discussion of the issue in the
TRIPs system. A key issue which emerged from these discussions was the unresolved
tension between the TRIPs agreement and the CBD. 108 While the CBD recognizes that
some sort of TK protection is needed for conservation purposes, the TRIPs agreement
is silent on the matter. At the face of it, there does not seem to be any conflict. The
tension arises from the concern that TK protection could lead to a violation of the
intellectual property rights protected under the TRIPs agreement. 109 It is not clear
which instrument would trump in cases of such potential conflict. Beyond this
particular tension, the general relationship between the two instruments continues to
be unresolved.

101 SILKE VON LEWINSKI,
INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 37 (2008).
102 Anderson, supra note 20, at 39.
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 102; See also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2017).
104
Indigenous Environmental Network, Indigenous People’s Seattle Declaration,
http://www.ienearth.org/indigenous-peoples-seattle-declaration/.
105 See recommendation regarding TRIPs (3, c,d and f), id.
106 Quinn, supra note 22, at 300.
107 Most of the submissions made at the meetings of the Council for TRIPs were from developing
countries and the Africa Group which tend to hold most of the world’s TK and genetic resources. For
a list of submissions made by member countries, see the annex list B. Council for TRIPs, The Protection
of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore - Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made
(IP/C/W/370/Rev.1) (World Trade Organization, 2006).
108 Anderson, supra note 20, at 39.
109 A frequently discussed instance in which such conflict between the CBD and TRIPS might
occur – the disclosure of origin requirement – is discussed towards the end of this sub-section. See
discussion on the ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement.
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An important development regarding the relationship between the two
instruments is the Doha ministerial meeting held in November, 2001. 110 The
Committee on Trade and Environment held the first discussions on TK protection
within the WTO framework in the context of reviewing TRIPs Article 27 (3) (b), which
provides for the patentability of some life forms, and the relationship between the WTO
and the CBD. 111 The declaration that emerged from the meeting (the Doha
Declaration) called on the Council for TRIPs to “examine, inter alia, the relationship
between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.” 112 The Doha Declaration also
mandated the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) to discuss the relationship
between TRIPs and the CBD. Both the Council and the Committee took up the matter
and served as forums for deliberation on TK protection, among other issues. Generally,
member countries of the WTO, most of which are also members of the CBD, agree to
the two key principles under the latter: the prior informed consent, 113 and access and
benefit sharing 114 principles. The high frequency with which these principles are used
in international instruments arguably signals the fact that they may have achieved a
status as a basic principle in international TK protection. However, members are in
disagreement as to the means of attaining the objectives sought under such
principles. 115
There are diverse issues that may spark conflicts between the CBD and TRIPs
when it comes to implementation. One core method of implementing the principles
and objectives of the CBD is the requirement for patent applicants to disclose the
origins of TK or genetic resources if the applicant used these resources in developing
the invention being considered for a patent. However, the necessity and efficacy of this
‘disclosure of origin’ requirement is a subject of vigorous debate among member

110
See
generally
Doha
WTO
Ministerial
Declaration
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (2001).
111 LEWINSKI, supra note 101, at 38.
112 See paragraph 19, Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) (2001).
113 The WIPO provides the following explanation for the term Prior Informed Consent (PIC) which
is at times referred to as Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC): “The purpose of the use of the
adjective ‘free’ is to ensure that no coercion or manipulation is used in the course of negotiations, while
inclusion of ‘prior’ acknowledges the importance of allowing time to indigenous [peoples] to fully
review proposals respecting the time required for achieving consensus. It also anticipates the reality
that decisions, especially those relating to major investments in development, are often taken in
advance with indigenous peoples. The notion of ‘informed’ consent reflects the growing acceptance
that environment and social impact assessment are a pre-requisite for any negotiation process and
allow all parties to make balanced decisions.” See “Prior Informed Consent” in World Intellectual
Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/resources/glossary.html#38 (follow Glossary: Key
terms related to intellectual property and genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions”).
114 Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) is generally understood to mean access by users of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge with the expectation of benefit sharing arising out of their
utilization.
115 See paragraph 18 and the following, Pascal Lamy, Issues Related to the Extention of the
Protection of Geographical Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to Products
other than Wines and Spirits and those Related to the Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and
the Convention on Biological Diversity, (WT/GC/W/633 TN/C/W/61) (2011).
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countries. 116 A common objection to the adoption of the requirement is that it may
hinder innovation because the process of disclosing all the origins of knowledge used
in the inventive process may prove to be too cumbersome and may make such process
more costly.
Mega diverse countries such as Brazil and India call for the amendment of the
TRIPs Agreement to include a mandatory ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement for member
states. 117 Most developed countries have not been keen on amending the TRIPs
agreement. For instance, the US as the most influential member of the WTO, objects
to the TRIPs council’s jurisdiction over TK protection. 118 The US, rather than making
amendments to the TRIPs Agreement, prefers national legislative measures and
allowing interested parties to enter into contractual relations on a case by case basis
without additional legal regulation. 119 Japan suggests the deliberation of such issues
at the WIPO instead of the TRIPs forum. 120 There are outliers, however, as developed
countries such as Norway 121 and Switzerland 122 have called for the establishment of
the ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement within the TRIPs. 123 Although the position of
countries on the establishment of the ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement does not rigidly
correlate to their level of economic development, the general division on positions does
reflect a North-South divide. However, a limited disclosure of origin requirement, the
violations of which do not have severe implications for patent holders, seems to enjoy
popular support. 124 Despite these vigorous deliberations in the past, the Doha round

116 World Trade Organization, Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, TRIPS: ISSUES,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm at 27; Lamy, supra note 115, Paragraph
18 and the following.
117 See generally Council for TRIPs, Doha Work Program – Relationship Between the TRIPs
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity - Appropriate action to be taken/decided by the
General Council on TRIPS & CBD - Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand,
Venezuela, LDC GROUP AND ACP GROUP (WT/GC/W/590, TN/C/W/49) (2008); See also id.
118 Frankel, at 237.
119 Council for TRIPs, Article 27.3(b), Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD,
and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore - Communication by the United States, at
3.
120 See generally Council for TRIPs, The Patent System and Genetic Resources - Communication
from Japan (IP/C/W/472) (2006).
121 See generally Council for TRIPs, The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement, The
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge - Amending the TRIPS
Agreement to Introduce an Obligation to Disclose the Origin of Genetic Resources and Traditional
Knowledge in Patent Applications - Communication from Norway (WT/GC/W/566, TN/C/W/42,
IP/C/W/473) (2006).
122 See generally Council for TRIPs, The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement, The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
and the Review of Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 - Communication from
Switzerland (IP/C/W/446) (2005).
123 Marion Panizzon & Thomas Cottier, Traditional Knowledge and Geographical Indications:
Foundations, Interests and Negotiating Positions, in Dev Ctries Doha Round WTO Decis-Mak Proced
WTO Negot Trade Agric Goods Serv, NCCR TRADE REGULATION WORKING PAPER NO 2005/01, 247
(2006).
124 WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Environment: Issues - Intellectual property and
the environment, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/trips_e.html.
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of deliberations on development issues, including TK protection, seems to have
stalled. 125
To sum up the discussions on TK protection under TRIPs, even though the issue
has been debated for well over a decade, a concrete outcome has yet to be achieved.
The debate is between mega diverse countries who call for TK protection through
amendments to the TRIPs Agreement, and some member countries (mostly developed
countries) who object to such amendments and prefer either no amendments or less
intrusive alternative measures. The current trend seems to be to discuss intellectual
property issues related to TK protection under the WIPO framework. The TRIPs
agreement as it stands does not extend protection to TK. As a result, proponents of
TK protection might have missed a key opportunity to benefit from the effective
implementation and enforcement mechanism of the WTO.
D. Other Forums
In contrast to the specific deliberations at the WTO, states have been more willing
to include references to TK protection in other forums. 126 However, the common
feature of these instruments is that they tend to be aspirational or general rather than
providing rights and obligations that could be enforced. Many instruments have
directly or indirectly called for TK protection. 127 Several United Nations agencies 128
and other international entities work on TK protection from the perspective of their
core mandate. Most of these institutions collaborate on some aspect of their work with
other entities working on TK protection. 129 As stated earlier, because of TK’s relevance
to biodiversity, biotechnology, food, agriculture and indigenous rights issues, many of
the instruments that govern such issues internationally also touch on TK protection.
Because of the diversity and high number of such initiatives, a detailed analysis of the
TK protection within these forums is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief
discussion of the work of the main international institutions and instruments which
have implications for TK protection is provided below.
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is a key forum in which genetic
resources and traditional agricultural knowledge have been discussed. The FAO
administers the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (IT PGRFA) 130 became adopted at the organization’s 31st session in
November, 2001. 131 The main success of the treaty is in establishing an innovative
Oguamanam, supra note 3, at 322.
See discussion in this section regarding the UN forums such as the Food and Agreicultural
Organization, and the World Health Organization.
127 See discussion in this section regarding UN instruments including the examination of the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (IT PGRFA).
128 For a list of the various UN agencies and projects on TK protection, see United Nations
University - Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability, Traditional Knowledge & the UN,
http://www.unutki.org/default.php?doc_id=23.
129 Id.
130 The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, UNFAO (3
November 2001).
131 Id.
125
126
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Multilateral System of Access and Benefit Sharing 132 which adopts a common pool
framework that covers 64 of the most important crops for humankind (representing
80% of human consumption). 133 The system allows citizens of signatory countries to
use the resources provided on the conditions that they use them for non-commercial
purposes and that they do not acquire IP rights over such resources. 134 However, the
IT PGRFA, similar to the CBD, has highly qualified language and frequently defers to
national legislation. 135 As such, the progress on TK protection through these
instruments is limited.
A more relevant UN agency for the purposes of traditional medicinal knowledge
is the World Health Organization (WHO). 136 In December 2000, the organization
discussed TK and IP issues at an Inter-Regional Workshop on Intellectual Property
Rights in the Context of Traditional Medicine. 137 Member states made 11 core
recommendations, the most important of which included the protection of TK
(including through customary and sui generis means), the documentation of public
domain traditional knowledge, the establishment and strengthening of national and
regional approaches, and the creation of benefit sharing schemes. 138 Because of the
space limitations, this paper will not discuss all international discussions on TK
protection. However, it is worth mentioning that many other UN agencies have
discussed TK protection in one form or another.
The cross-cutting nature of TK has resulted in the issue being discussed in many
international forums where each has a particular area of focus. Such an approach,
where each forum brings to bear its own expertise, may offer considerable advantages,
especially when these forums collaborate with each other to avoid overlap. However,
without a lead institution with clear authority, there is risk of a piecemeal approach
to TK protection that fails to yield a comprehensive solution to the problems. 139 The
WIPO seems to be assuming a lead role. The negotiations taking place at the WIPOIGC focus on TK protection in an independent and holistic manner rather than
focusing on any particular aspect of it. 140 Many states hope the draft articles being
negotiated at the WIPO-IGC will result in an effective global mechanism that provides
clear solutions unlike previous attempts at TK protection. The following section is
devoted to examining the key features of the draft articles instrument.

See Part IV, Article 10 and the following, id.
See Annex 1 of id.
134 See CBD, Article 12.3.
135 The International Treaty (2001).
136 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/en/ (last visited Sep. 7,
2017).
137 Report of the Inter-regional Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of
Traditional Medicine, Workshop report (New Delhi and Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001).
138 See id. at 34-35.
139 Sophia Twarog, Preserving, Protecting and Promoting Traditional Knowledge: National
Actions and International Dimentions, Sophia Twarog & Promila Kapoor, eds, (2004) at 61.
140 ROBINSON ET. AL., supra note 44, at 3.
132
133
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IV. THE WIPO DRAFT ARTICLES AND THE ‘INCENTIVE TO CODIFY’
The ‘Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles’ 141 - an instrument that
WIPO IGC has been working on for a decade - is a highly contentious instrument. The
contentions relate to both the general nature and purpose of the document and the
details of almost all twelve provisions within it. 142 The nature of the document will
substantially change depending on which alternative wording or option is ultimately
accepted under each provision. 143 Because of the tentative nature of most of the
provisions, detailed analysis of the rights and obligations proposed in it is infeasible.
Instead, what is provided below is a general discussion of key features of the
instrument that creates fault lines in the deliberations at the WIPO IGC. Such
discussions will focus on how these issues affect the codification and disclosure of
traditional knowledge as developed.
The Draft Articles have three parts: The preamble/introduction, the policy
objective, and the substantive and procedural provisions. A brief discussion of each
section is provided below. An analysis of the key features that seem to create an
unbridged gap will follow thereafter.
The preamble/introduction contains nine distinct but interrelated statements on
TK protection listing the goals of the Draft Articles. 144 The section includes
paragraphs on the recognition of the value of TK, the need to promote awareness of,
and respect for, TK, the promotion of preservation of TK, the relationship between the
Draft Articles and other international agreements and processes, the promotion of
access to knowledge and safeguarding of the public domain, the documentation and
conservation of TK, the promotion of innovation, the creation of new rules and
principles, and the relationship of the framework with customary use. 145 Paragraph
six of this section is particularly important for the purposes of this paper because it
highlights the need for the documentation, conservation, and disclosure of TK. The
paragraph states:
Document and conserve traditional knowledge
(vi) contribute to the documentation and conservation of traditional
knowledge, encouraging traditional knowledge to be disclosed, learned and
used in accordance with relevant customary practices, norms, laws, and/or
understandings of traditional knowledge holders, including those customary
141 World Intellectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, The Protection of Traditional
Knowledge: Draft Articles, WIPO (2014) [hereafter Draft Articles] The latest version at the time of the
writing of this paper was published on March 28, 2014 and thus the analysis discussed in this paper
will be based on such version.
142 See generally id.
143 For a more detailed discussion of the key elements of an earlier version of the Draft Articles
see TOBIAS KIENE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
FIELD: AN INTERCULTURAL PROBLEM ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA (Münster; New York, NY;
München; Berlin: Waxmann Verlag GmbH, Germany, 2011).
144 See The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles, WIPO (2013).
145 See id.
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practices, norms, laws and/or understandings that require prior informed
consent or approval and involvement and mutually agreed terms
before the traditional knowledge can be disclosed, learned or used by
others; 146(Emphasis added).
Given that this is the only paragraph which does not have brackets, it seems that
all members of the WIPO IGC agree with the need to document, conserve and disclose
TK. It should be noted that the paragraph recognizes the basic standards of ‘prior
informed consent,’ ‘approval and involvement,’ and ‘mutually agreed terms.’ 147
Although these principles are being debated with regard to their specific application,
their inclusion in many of the international instruments dealing with TK suggest that
they have achieved a certain stature as accepted principles in the international
deliberation of TK protection. It should be noted here that the documentation of TK is
a new addition as a core goal of the Draft Articles. Previous versions of the Draft
Articles do not mention the need to document or codify TK. As such, it could be thought
of as a new consensus for advancing the goal of international TK protection.
The title of this first part – preamble/introduction – seems to be where we see our
first sign of contention in the instrument. Since preambles are customary sections in
documents of a strong legal nature, it seems that some members of the committee
prefer to use the term ‘introduction’ which implies that the document provides little
legal force behind it. 148 The contention does not stop with the title. Complete wording
of three of the nine preamble/introductory statements is contested. 149 The paragraphs
on the promotion of access to knowledge and the safeguarding of the public domain,
and those on the provision of new rules and disciplines have been put in brackets to
show that some prefer to delete the entire statement deleted from the instrument. 150
Some members have provided an alternative paragraph to the statement on the
promotion of awareness and respect for TK. 151
Additionally, key features of almost all paragraphs in this preamble/introductory
section are also put in brackets because of disagreements on wordings. 152 For instance,
the first paragraph focusing on the recognition of the value of TK lists the several
values that TK might have for society including intellectual, spiritual and social
values. 153 However, it seems that members could not agree on the recognition of the
economic/commercial values of TK as these terms have been put in brackets.
In contrast to the nine statements under the preamble/introduction, the policy
objectives focus on two main issues: the granting of certain rights to knowledge holding
communities and the prevention of the granting of erroneous patent rights over TK. 154
Despite their focus on these two issues, the statements in the policy objectives section
are also filled with alternative statements.
Id. at 2.
Id.
148 Id. at 2.
149 Id.
150 See generally Draft Articles, WIPO (2013).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 2.
154 Id. at 3-7.
146
147
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The above section briefly discusses the first two sections of the Draft Articles: the
preamble/introduction and the policy objectives. The following section will discuss the
key issues that have created gaps between the negotiating positions of member
countries, which in some instances have resulted in the creation of groupings of likeminded states. As stated above, while a detailed discussion of each article in the
instrument is not feasible, an examination of the core issues that have stalled the Draft
Articles deliberation seems useful at this point. It is the hope that such discussion will
shed some light on the contents of the third section of the Draft Articles – the
substantive and procedural provisions. 155
A. Key Issues of Contention
The key issues that have given rise to tension between the negotiating blocks may
generally be grouped into four topics. These include: 1) the definition of TK, especially
on whether it should be expanded to include traditional cultural expression or limited
to traditional knowledge; 2) the legal nature of the Draft Articles (i.e. whether they
should be a binding international instrument or some version of a soft law or
guideline); 3) the recurring tension between inserting flexibilities in the instrument
and attempting to make it effective and enforceable; and 4) the interaction between
TK systems of protection and existing intellectual property laws; that is which should
prevail in case of irreconcilable conflict. 156 These core issues, discussed in further
detail below, have divided member countries of the WIPO IGC ever since details of the
instrument began being discussed in this forum. While these issues have implications
for many areas of the Draft Articles and TK protection, the analysis in this section
focuses mainly on the effect of the issues on the encouragement of TK codification.
A rough grouping of the member countries on all sides of the debate shows
divisions along levels of economic development. Developing countries which hold most
TK generally tend to advocate stronger protection of TK while developed countries, in
which most multinational corporations that use TK reside, tend to resist strong
protection of TK. 157 This can be seen in the deliberations of the IGC and the positions
that member countries take. 158 However, there are some outlier developed countries
that defy such categorizations by taking a mid-way position. New Zealand, Australia,
Norway and Switzerland seem to be members that tend to take such positions on some
occasions. 159 Additionally, as explained earlier in Section III C., the divide in the IGC
debate is more complex than just a simple grouping of countries divided based on their
See Draft Articles, WIPO (2013) at 8-9
See Center for International Environmental Law, Infra note 161.
157 See generally Wallbot, supra note 77.
158 Id.
159 For instance, see comments made by delegations from New Zealand, Australia, Norway and
Switzerland. Circulation of Comments Received on Documents WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 AND
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4 (WIPO/GRTKF/IC//10/INF/2) WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
(2006); The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Addendum to Collation of Written Comments on the
List of Issues (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/5(a) Add.) WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 3 Annex
(2007). As highlighted earlier Norway and Switzerland have been leaders in the amendment of the
Patent Cooperation Treaty and the International Patent Classification to include TK.
155
156
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level of economic development. 160 It involves like-minded countries which have diverse
interests within a broader agenda, and positions which are adopted as part of a broad
political strategy that spans issues and international forums of deliberation.
1. Tensions in Defining TK
Most indigenous peoples and local communities see TK as an integral part of their
culture and identity. Representatives of indigenous groups who have attended the
WIPO IGC process have noted this fact on several occasions. 161 Their call is for TK
protection to be discussed together with traditional cultural expressions and genetic
resources. 162 WIPO also recognizes the interconnectedness of these issues, and these
issues were dealt with together at the beginning of the IGC process. 163 However, as
deliberations progressed at the IGC, the committee began dealing with TK separate
from traditional cultural expressions and genetic resources, while still recognizing
their interconnected and holistic nature. 164 Currently, there are separate workshops,
negotiations, and instruments for TK, traditional cultural expressions, 165 and genetic
resources. 166
The Draft Articles document reflects this tension in defining TK. The ‘use of
terms’ section of the Draft Articles, which provides definitions for key legal terms used
in the instrument, adopts the following definition of TK:
Traditional knowledge [refers to]/[includes]/[means], for the purposes of
this instrument, know-how, skills, innovations, practices, teachings and
learnings of [indigenous [peoples] and [local communities]]/[or a state or
states].
[Traditional knowledge may be associated, in particular, with fields such as
agriculture, the environment, healthcare and indigenous and traditional
medical knowledge, biodiversity, traditional lifestyles and natural resources
and genetic resources, and know-how of traditional architecture and
construction technologies.] 167
The first paragraph of this definition adopts a narrow scope and limits the
definition to what is defined in this paper as TK. The second paragraph situates TK
See generally Section III C., infra.
Center for International Environmental Law, The Gap Between Indigenous People’s Demands
and WIPO’s Framework on Traditional Knowledge (2007) at 3.
162 Id. at 1-8.
163 Id. at 12.
164 KIENE, supra note 143, at 215.
165 WIPO: Traditional Cultural Expressions, WORLD INTELLECT PROP ORGAN - INTERGOV. COMM.
INTELLECT
PROP
GENET
RESOUR.
TRADIT.
KNOWL.
TRADIT.
CUTURAL.
EXPR.,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore/..
166 WIPO: Genetic Resources, WORLD INTELLECT PROP ORGAN - INTERGOV. COMM. INTELL. PROP.
GENET. RESOUR. TRADI.T KNOWL. TRADIT. CUTURAL. EXPR., http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/.
167 Draft Articles, WIPO (2013) at 10.
160
161
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in a holistic manner as a concept interconnected with “traditional lifestyles” and
“genetic resources”. 168 However, the second paragraph is fully placed in brackets
which means member countries did not all agree that the second paragraph should be
part of the definition of TK. 169 The link between TK and cultural expressions is also
mentioned in Article 1.3 of the Draft Articles. 170 In outlining the subject matter of
protection the Draft Articles acknowledge that TK is somehow linked to “the cultural
[and/[or] social identity and cultural heritage of indigenous [peoples] and local
communities …” 171 While these disagreements may seem to be minor technicalities,
the debate about the scope of TK remains as one of the key issues stalling the
deliberation of the Draft Articles.
The tension over defining TK is related to the underlying differences in the world
view of ‘modern societies,’ on the one hand, and indigenous peoples and local
communities on the other. The tendency to divide TK from traditional cultural
expressions seems to stem from two factors - existing practice and pragmatism. The
preference for following existing practices in conventional intellectual property
literature and legislation may be the first root cause. While traditional know-how
relates to the subject matters of protection under patent law, traditional cultural
expressions are more closely associated with literary and artistic expressions protected
under copyright law. Consequently, members of the IGC may have chosen to be
pragmatic and simply cluster the issues into a ‘western’ categorization of intellectual
property. 172
Following the pragmatic route, the definition adopted in this paper is a narrow
one and refers to the know-how, skills, practices and innovations of indigenous peoples
and local communities. However, TK codification should be as holistic as possible.
Holistic documentation covering the cultural context in which the TK was developed
is more valuable to users because it can provide more informative ways of developing
successful products. Holistic documentation may also serve to satisfy historical and
anthropological interests in the TK and the surrounding cultural environment. This
is not to argue that rights in TK should extend to the expressive elements of the
codification. Even if TK is documented in a holistic manner within its cultural context,
the features that would give rise to rights and responsibilities would be limited to the
know-how that is used by outsiders. Therefore, while a narrow definition that refers
to know-how, rather than cultural expressions, is preferred in this thesis, the actual
codification does not need to exclude the cultural context in which TK is found.
2. The Legal Nature of the Draft Articles
The most contentious issue at the IGC seems to be the legal nature of the Draft
Articles. 173 Member countries have been consistently divided on the question of
Id.
Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 KIENE, supra note 143, at 240.
173 Id. at 234–235.
168
169
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whether the process should focus on establishing a legally binding international
instrument or a non-binding document. The implication of this disagreement seems
to be the major issue stalling the progress of deliberations at the IGC. The interests
of member states with regard to what form the Draft Articles should take are widely
diverse. For example, the United States consistently voices its objection to the
establishment of a binding legal instrument preferring to leave the instrument as a
suggestive document, while the European Union prefers to leave the option open for
future decision making. 174 The delegations of Australia and New Zealand have
proposed the adoption of guidelines that the latter calls a “menu of options
approach.” 175 Developing countries such as India, Turkey, and Brazil, among others,
and the African Group, argue that TK protection will not be effective without a binding
international instrument. 176 Because member countries have yet to agree on what
legal form the Draft Articles should take, the most recent version of the instrument
does not reflect much progress since its earlier versions.
Several international instruments adopt general statements on the need to
protect TK. The problem is not a lack of international documents providing
aspirational statements and general principles. Rather, the lack of a clear and binding
legal instrument seems to be what is missing. The gap in the positions of states and
the resulting frustration with the lack of progress may be one of the causes of the
protectionist trend that megadiverse countries are adopting. Thus, although limited
in scope, some form of binding international instrument will be necessary if the global
use of TK in modern industries is to achieve its full potential.
The
preamble/introductory statements and policy objectives are general areas where there
is considerable consensus. Some form of minimum protection could be developed out
of such provisions. Therefore, what is needed is a point of minimum consensus that
would garner the support of the highest number of jurisdictions and still be able to
provide enough protection to facilitate the codification and disclosure of TK.
As mentioned earlier, the need to document and conserve TK is one of the few
uncontested preamble/introductory statements in the Draft Articles. As such, the need
to incentivize the codification of TK could be used as an organizing principle for
establishing minimum binding protection. The binding nature of TK protection could
have significant implications for its effectiveness which, in turn, may be expected to
impact the framework’s ability to create a sustainable system of codification and
disclosure.
3. Flexibilities vs. Effectiveness/Enforceability
The other major point of contention evident in many documents of the IGC
negotiations is the tension between flexibility and effectiveness. On the one hand,
174 See generally statements made by the EU and USA The Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
Factual Extraction, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE at 8–10.
175 KIENE, supra note 143, at 235; It seems that the existence of a considerable and vocal
indigenous peoples in Australia and New Zealand has succeeded in influencing the position of these
governments at the IGC.
176 See generally comments made by India, Brazil and the African Group supra note 107, at 84.
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groups made up of developing states and indigenous peoples, and local communities
are pushing for the establishment of some sort of clear and enforceable legal documents
while, on the other hand, a group of developed countries advocates the need to preserve
flexibilities. 177 The call for flexibilities includes arguments for the need to leave policy
space for member countries to establish TK protection systems that respond to the
unique features of their jurisdictions, national interests, and the socio-political
climate. Actors calling for flexibilities also point to the scope of protected TK as an
area requiring flexibility.
A close observer of the politics of international IP law 178 may find some irony in
such statements as most of the countries that push for the establishment of flexibilities
in international TK protection systems are the same actors who lead international
efforts for the harmonization of stronger international IP laws. For instance, the
United States is a leader in the international harmonization of intellectual property
laws through both multilateral and bilateral agreements. However, the US delegation
at the WIPO IGC consistently focuses on respect for “the important concepts of freedom
of choice and flexibility for Member States addressing these issues and concerns.” 179
Similarly, the Canadian delegation commented that IGC’s work “would have to allow
for maximum flexibility to take into account the diverse nature of Committee members’
present and future efforts …” 180 This can be contrasted to the position of these
countries on other international treaties in which international obligations limiting
domestic policy space are accepted with much more enthusiasm.
This is not to say that calls for flexibilities are illegitimate. There is a genuine
need to provide policy space for member countries to establish an appropriate TK
protection system for their own jurisdictions based on their socio-political and
economic realities. Given the diversity of stakeholders involved in the conservation
and use of TK, and the different interests in this regard, it may be impossible, or at
least premature, to establish a globally harmonized TK protection system. However,
as is done in other areas of international law, in general, and international IP
instruments in particular, the goal should be to balance flexibility with legal certainty
and enforceability. In this sense, some level of protection that reflects the minimum
consensus at the international level seems justifiable. This is especially necessary
given the failure of general and vague statements in existing international
instruments to address the problem of TK loss and ensure its sustained use.
If the goal is to make some progress at the international stage, the focus should
be on addressing the common problem of the alarming rate of TK loss and the
inefficiencies associated with using TK. In this regard, there is a general agreement
on the need to halt the ‘misappropriation’ of TK and to stop the granting of non-

See generally Wallbot, supra note 77.
It should be noted that there is no single and organized body of ‘international intellectual
property law.’ The term ‘international intellectual property law’ is used loosely and for the sake of
convenience to refer to the body of laws that have direct implications for the regulation of the creation,
use and distribution of inventions, and literary and artistic creations.
179 Draft Report (Second Draft) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/14 Prov 2., SECRETARIAT OF THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, ¶ 204 (2016).
180 Id. ¶ 224.
177
178
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innovative patents. 181 A balance should be struck between providing flexibility for
member countries to establish differing domestic laws, and the provision of some
baseline protection ensuring legal certainty and enforceability. The uncertainty
related to TK protection creates major transaction costs that discourage users from
using TK in their research and development. 182 If an international legal regime could
provide some level of certainty and consistency, the incentivizing effect of legal
intervention for the codification and disclosure of TK could be expected to increase.
4. The Interactions Between TK Protection and Existing IP Law
The relationship between the Draft Articles and existing international
instruments, including IP laws, has been another issue upon which members of the
IGC have not agreed. While some members of the IGC, including the European Union,
push to make the Draft Articles consistent with existing international IP laws, other
members, (mostly developing countries such as Brazil and India) and the African
Group, argue that this would unfairly subordinate TK protection systems to existing
systems of IP protection. 183 The Indian delegation noted that “the genesis of the [IGC]
could be traced back to the shared understanding that the IP system should be
supportive of the protection of TK and not run contrary to its objectives and
principles.” 184 The Brazilian delegation added that existing IP rules are part of the
problem as acts of bio-piracy use weaknesses in existing patent laws to misappropriate
TK. 185 This gap in views has persisted to date and can be seen in the Draft Articles. 186
The fourth preamble/introductory provision in the most recent version of the Draft
Articles states that the instrument should “take account of, and operate consistently
with, other international and regional instruments and processes, in particular
regimes that relate to intellectual property and access to and benefit sharing of genetic
resources which are associated with that traditional knowledge.” 187 This paragraph is
one of the two uncontested preamble/introductory statements. If the instrument is
approved with such wording, the proposed system of TK protection may have to comply
with existing IP laws inclusive of features that may undercut its core purpose. On the
face of it, the last part of the provision calling for consistency with existing systems of
“access to and benefit sharing of genetic resources” may seem to have some potential
181 Compilation of Comments Received On the Second Draft of an Examination of Issues Relating
to the Interrelation of Access to Genetic Resources and Disclosure Requirements in Intellectual Property
Rights Applications Subsequent to an Ad hoc Intergovernmental Meeting on Genetic Resources and
Disclosure Requirements (WIPO/IP/GR/05/INF/5), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 13
Annex (2005).
182 KIENE, supra note 143, at 242; Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent
Office: A Road Under Construction, BIODIVERS LAW INTELLECT PROP BIOTECHNOL TRADIT KNOWL,
246 (2007).
183 Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore: Seventh Session - Report (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/15), SECRETARIAT OF THE
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, ¶¶ 11, 15, 110, 120, 126 (2005).
184 Id. ¶ 106.
185 Id. ¶ 110.
186 See generally Draft Articles, WIPO (2013).
187 Id. at 2.
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to save the Draft Articles from becoming subordinate to existing IP laws. 188 This is so
because the phrase ‘access and benefit sharing’ mechanism seems to be a reference to
the system established under the Convention on Biodiversity. 189 However, the CBD
framework is limited in its ability to protect TK since the wording adopted in the
framework is highly general and mostly aspirational.
As a result, the
preamble/introductory statement calling for consistency with existing laws will mainly
refer to the strong IP rights that fail to protect TK. Consequently, this might further
limit the potential of the Draft Articles to bring about effective TK protection
framework by making them subordinate to existing laws.
The more substantive provision on the matter, Article 10 states: “[t]his
instrument [should]/[shall] establish a mutually supportive relationship [between
[intellectual property [patent] rights [directly based on] [involving] [the utilization of]
traditional knowledge and with relevant [existing] international agreements and
treaties.]” 190 (Emphasis added). The term ‘mutually supportive’ is unclear. It does not
seem to make the Draft Articles subordinate to other instruments, but it also does not
state that the instrument should trump other instruments in cases of conflict. In an
international arena where most other relevant instruments, including the TRIPs
Agreement, prohibit signatories from agreeing to conflicting obligations in other
instruments, the neutrality of the Draft Articles may ultimately result in their
subordination to other instruments.
The relationship of the Draft Articles to other instruments may affect the
incentive of knowledge holding communities to codify and disclose their TK. This is
because existing IP laws could be used against the interest of knowledge holding
communities. For instance, there is no binding international patent instrument
requiring the disclosure of TK used in the process of an invention. Users may obtain
a patent on an invention based on TK. Thus, knowledge holder communities may
hesitate to codify and disclose their knowledge if documentation means easy access to
outsiders who may receive exclusive rights over such knowledge.
To summarize the points made in this section, the Draft Articles are replete with
contentious alternative wordings that make detailed analysis of the provisions
contained in it infeasible at this time. The nature of the Draft Articles will change
drastically depending upon which wordings are accepted in its final version. Instead
of a detailed analysis of the instrument, the above section examined the key issues of
contention followed by an investigation of the implications for the codification and
disclosure of TK. The section argued that a legally binding international instrument
with a considerable level of certainty is needed in order to encourage the codification
and disclosure of TK. Such an instrument will be capable of building confidence among
knowledge-holder communities in that they will have a say in what happens to their
knowledge once it is codified and disclosed.
Now that the Draft Articles and their implications for codification and disclosure
of TK have been analyzed, the following section will proceed to use the need to
encourage TK codification and disclosure as an organizing principle (a minimum
consensus) to investigate the concepts and approaches that need to be adopted to
provide sufficient international protection for TK. The section will also comment on
Id.
Id.
190 Id. at 25.
188
189
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attempts by developing countries to establish TK protection through Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs).
V. TRENDS AND SCENARIOS: A MINIMUM INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
The above sections have shown the diverse levels of interests in protecting TK and
the varied methods that stakeholders have adopted to achieve such goal. Thus, the
purpose of this section is to examine what concepts could garner a sufficient level of
consensus needed to provide an effective protection of TK that would encourage its
codification and disclosure. As such, the discussion will focus on a few of the many
innovative approaches and tools proposed by scholars.
This paper began by addressing the problem of extra-territorial free-riding that
may arise from the territoriality of domestic rights in TK. The risk identified became
that some countries which are net importers of TK might decline to establish any kind
of TK protection system, domestically, in order to make use of TK disclosed as a result
of protection provided in another jurisdiction. While there may be domestic measures,
such as confidentiality and deferred disclosure, which can increase the effectiveness of
the proposed system, the full potential of the proposed framework will only be realized
if there is some form of international framework that can facilitate the use of TK in
modern industries. The sub-sections below analyze some of the approaches that states
might take at the international level to establish an effective framework.
A. Minimum Substantive Protection
As the key issues of contention at the WIPO IGC discussed in the previous sections
have shown, a major fault line in the deliberations is the question of which issues to
address through international mechanisms and which to leave for domestic legal
systems. The significant gap between the positions of groups of member states implies
that the IGC process is far from creating a substantive international treaty. The
potential solution seems to lie in an approach balanced between providing sufficient
flexibilities to national legal systems to define what form TK protection will take
within their jurisdictions, and reducing the negative effects of the territoriality of such
systems.
Consequently, the core question to respond to in terms of international protection
would be, what sort of international protection could garner sufficient support among
countries while also encouraging the documentation and disclosure of TK? In order to
respond to this question, one may need to look to the development of a similar legal
framework under international law – patent laws. The history of international patent
law goes back more than a century and begins with the signing of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (the Paris Convention) in 1883. 191
Until the enactment of the TRIPs agreement under the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international IP law provided substantial
191 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, (Mar. 1883) (1979) [Paris
Convention].

[17:42 2017]

The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
Searching for the Minimum Consensus

74

flexibilities for domestic legal systems to enact domestic IP laws that would meet
international standards. 192 The Paris Convention focused on two core elements: 1) the
establishment of substantive minima – minimum features of domestic legislations that
member countries were required to enact, and 2) a requirement to provide the same
type of protection to citizens and foreign national – national treatment. 193 The detailed
definition and scope of protection were left to the domestic legal systems of member
countries. 194 Under such a system, signatories were prohibited from discriminating
against foreign rights holders based on their nationality. 195 However, they were
required to provide IP protection to foreigners only if they provide the same rights to
their citizens. 196
The TRIPs Agreement shifted this century old practice. Article 1 (3) of the TRIPs
Agreement states that “Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this
Agreement to the nationals of other Members.” 197 Thus, signatories are required to
provide protection to nationals of other countries even if the member country did not
provide such protection under its domestic law. 198 This is a drastic change to the
international IP law framework. It is seen as the first major step towards the
harmonization of IP laws at the international level. 199 Additionally, the TRIPs
Agreement also requires compliance with most favored nation treatment (MFN). 200
The MFN principle requires member states to give the same treatment it provides to
nationals of its ‘most favored nation’ to all members of the WTO. 201 In the current
international IP system, the requirements of national treatment and most favored
nation treatment have been accepted as basic principles. 202
Given this brief history of the evolution of international IP law, the development
of international TK protection should also begin with basic principles on which most
member states have reached consensus, instead of attempting to establish a globally
harmonized substantive level of protection. The TRIPs Agreement came about
through intense pressure from developed countries including, most notably, the United
States. 203 An international TK framework has not garnered the same type of support
from influential states. In fact most developed countries are opposed to a binding
substantive international treaty on TK. 204 Current advocates of international TK
protection may not be able to influence international fora without the support of more
192 Charles McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 1283, 1286 (1998).
193 Graeme B Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77
CHIC-KENT LAW REV. 993, 994–995 (2001).
194 Id.
195 Paris Convention, art. 2 (1).
196 Id.
197 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, TRIPS (15 April 1994).
198 Jerome H Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT. LAWYER 345, 351 (1995).
199 Id. at 383.
200 Id. at 348.
201 TRIPS, supra note 197, at 322.
202 Reichman, supra note 198, at 347.
203 Reichman, at 355.
204 See generally Wallbot, supra note 77.
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developed countries. Thus, the most feasible path forward for the TK protection seems
to be to begin from the minimum international consensus and to garner sufficient
support from like-minded jurisdictions.
Since the basic principles of the national treatment and most favored nation
treatment have become ubiquitous in international IP law, the use of such principles
seems the logical starting point for the creation of an international TK protection
framework. In fact, Article 11 of the Draft Articles requires national treatment. 205
Surprisingly, Article 11 is also highly contested, with three different versions of the
provision proposed. 206 While two of the alternate provisions correspond to the basic
principle of national treatment, the other is a clear statement allowing member states
to provide “more extensive protection for their nationals” than to nationals of other
member countries. 207 It is not evident from the Draft Articles document how many
countries are against the basic principle of national treatment. Therefore, it might be
the case that most members agree to national treatment, but a few states objected to
it, giving rise to a separate version. Despite the fact that the national treatment
provision in the Draft Articles is contested, it seems to be one of the few provisions
with the potential to be accepted by most member countries.
Given the diversity in interest among negotiators, a feasible path forward is for
the Draft Articles to create a mandatory baseline protection made up of a few core
provisions and principles based on the minimum consensus available within the IGC
forum and to leave the details of the framework for domestic jurisdictions to address
based on the socio-political and economic situations of the country.
The
preamble/introductory statements in the Draft Articles are a good place to start in
creating consensus. 208 As mentioned in the earlier section, the need to document and
conserve TK is one of the few uncontested statements in the Draft Articles. As such,
the international effort to set up an international treaty should focus on the need to
encourage the codification and disclosure of TK as an organizing principle for the
establishment of a framework. It is possible that most user countries might not agree
to some of the principles and the scope of protection. In such a scenario, user countries
could build pressure by establishing a united front of like-minded mega diverse states
that proposes organized and strategic policies and negotiating positions. 209
In terms of substantive provisions, the Draft Articles should include a few
provisions that could encourage countries to provide effective TK protection within
their jurisdictions. Given the purpose of these provisions, they will have to be
Draft Articles, at 26.
See id.
207 Id.
208 See Draft Articles, supra note 141, at 2.
209 Field and Fisher suggest that source countries of genetic resources and TK show a united front
against user firms to avoid a “race to the bottom” scenario. The proposal made in this section is similar
to Field and Fisher’s proposal but it is proposed in terms of the global politics and negotiation between
source countries and user countries. MARTHA A FIELD & WILLIAM W FISHER, LEGAL REFORM IN
CENTRAL AMERICA : DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PROPERTY SYSTEMS 255 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2001); A proposal for the need to create a biodiversity cartel
was made by Vogel. This later proposal is similar to the one made in this section as it relates to global
politics of using TK. See generally Joseph H Vogel, From ‘the Tragedy of the Commons’ to the ‘Tragedy
of the Common Place’: Analysis and Synthesis Through the Lens of Economic Theory, BIODIVERS LAW
INTELLECT PROP BIOTECHNOL TRADIT KNOWL (Charles McManis, ed,) (2007).
205
206
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somewhat general. It is proposed that the Draft Articles include five provisions on the
following issues: A provision defining TK and the general subject matter that should
be subject to protection (currently included in Article 1 of the Draft Articles); 210 a new
article requiring the establishment of domestic frameworks that would encourage the
codification and disclosure of TK through databases/registries; an article setting out
enforcement measures (Article 4); 211 provisions on national treatment and MFN
treatment (Article 11); 212 and a provision on the relationship of the instrument to other
international agreements (Article 10). 213
The instrument needs to define the subject matter of protection. This will be
necessary if signatories are to be accountable for whether or not they have set up
systems that would address the issue. Although most of the parties in the IGC
negotiation agree that TK should include traditional know-how (as defined in this
paper), there is debate about whether the definition should be broad and include
concepts such as cultural expression. 214 The definition provided does not have to be a
detailed and rigid one. A non-exhaustive list of subjects that should be included in the
definition of TK may suffice. In addition to defining TK, the purpose of TK protection
will have to be set out in the instrument. This paper argues that the purpose of TK
protection should include the codification and disclosure of TK. The Draft Articles
already have such a statement but expressed only as an aspirational/preamble term. 215
Given the need to craft guidance to domestic legal systems, the core purpose of
protection may need to be explicitly stated in the body of the instrument.
The instrument will also have to require that there be some sort of effective
enforcement measure that is not burdensome for knowledge holder communities or
users. The details of the methods of enforcement to be adopted should be left for
member countries to determine. There is a recent trend in which infringement of IP
laws has been increasingly criminalized. 216 However, this trend is criticized because
of the negative effect it might have on innovation and creativity. 217 Given the
uncertainties involved in using TK in ‘modern life,’ the provision of criminal sanctions
does not seem warranted. 218 The instrument could generally require that there be civil
sanctions and provide policy space for countries to choose what measures to adopt in
their domestic legal systems. These civil measures could include exclusive property
rights requiring consent before access; a right of compensation; injunctive relief.
As discussed earlier, the principles of national treatment, and most favored
national treatment, are basic principles in international IP law. These are also issues
that can only be dealt with in an international forum. 219 Thus, they should be included
See generally Draft Articles, at 10.
Id. at 15-16.
212 Id. at 26.
213 Id. at 25; Carvalho proposes the establishment of only two provisions in an international TK
instrument one that defines TK and another one that sets out enforcement mechanisms. Carvalho,
supra note 182, at 265–266.
214 See generally Wallbot, supra note 77.
215 Draft Articles, at 2.
216 See, e.g., Irina D Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24:2 HARV. J LAW TECHNOL. 469 (2011).
217 Id.
218 Carvalho, at 266.
219 PAUL GOLDSTEIN AND MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS, (4th ed. 2016).
210
211
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in any international framework for TK protection. The instrument will also need to
address what its relationship to existing and future international agreements should
be. As highlighted earlier, this issue becomes contentious, and reaching a consensus
might not be easy. However, it is an issue that needs to be addressed, and it has to be
addressed in an international forum. A potential mid-way solution is for the
instrument to take precedence in cases directly affecting TK protection and to defer to
other instruments for issues that fall within that instruments core mandate. Potential
conflicts between an international TK protection framework and other international
instruments should not be overstated, however. Many potential conflicts could be
resolved by interpreting instruments in light of the spirit of each legal framework. As
a complementary measure, a dispute settlement mechanism could be established for
the interpretation of conflicting provisions to address cases in which there are clear
and unresolved conflicts.
B. The ‘Disclosure of Origin’ Requirement
After first being mentioned in the Andean Community Decisions no. 391 (1996)
and 486 (2000), the ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement took center stage in the
international deliberations on TK protection. 220 The requirement began in discussions
relating to genetic resources, but it has currently become one of the key topics
discussed at the WIPO – IGC discussions in TK protection as well. 221 As stated earlier
in this paper, the disclosure of origin requirement refers to the obligation that would
be imposed on patent applicants to disclose the country of origin, or source of TK, or
genetic resources used in the creating the invention. 222 In some jurisdictions, the
requirement includes an obligation to produce evidence showing that the applicant has
complied with the laws of countries of origin or source relating to access to TK and
genetic resources. 223 Advocates believe the disclosure of origin requirement will
provide an efficient system to regulate the relationship between TK holders and
users. 224
The requirement has been adopted in many developing countries and some
developed countries. 225 Notably, the 1998 European Union Biotechnology Directive
includes a voluntary system of disclosure of origin, in which patent applicants are
encouraged, but not required, to disclose the origins of TK used in developing their
invention. 226 Furthermore, jurisdictions such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
The Andean Pact, Decision 391 - Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, (2 July 1996);
Andean Community, Decision No. 486 - Establishing the Common Industrial Property Regime, (14
September 2000).
221 Id.
222 Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, The Disclosure of Origin Requirement in Central America: Legal
Texts, Practical Experience and Implementation Challenges, Issue Paper No. 3, INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (ICTSD), 16 (2010).
223 Id. at 4-8.
224 Id.
225 World Intellectual Property Organization, Disclosure Requirements Table, Available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/documents/pdf/genetic_resources_disclosure.pdf (2016).
226 Recital 27 of the directive states “Whereas if an invention is based on biological material of
plant or animal origin or if it uses such material, the patent application should, where appropriate,
220
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Sweden and Switzerland have adopted requirements for the disclosure of origin, while
Norway has added the requirement of showing that Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
under the law of the country of origin has been met. 227 More recently, the EU has
advocated the adoption of a mandatory disclosure of origin requirement. 228 The Bonn
Guidelines, discussed earlier, calls on countries to “take measures to encourage the
disclosure of origin of genetic resources and of the origins of traditional knowledge.” 229
Despite the popularity of the requirement among many countries, it remains
contentious. Critics of the requirement cite several reasons for their objection
including: the considerable burden that inventors will be required to bear, the risk that
adding new conditions for patent rights may reduce the incentivizing effect of patent
rights, and the lack of expertise of patent examiners and other issues related to
feasibility. 230 Proponents of the disclosure of origin requirement consider it to be part
of a larger movement to make patent laws more responsive to the interests of
developing countries and marginalized communities. 231
The ‘disclosure of origin’ discussions take place in many forums and particularly
at the WIPO – IGC, CBD, and WTO meetings. 232 However, delegates have yet to agree
on core questions, which include: Should the requirement be mandatory or voluntary?
Should disclosure be limited to information on sources? Or should it include a
requirement to prove Prior Informed Consent (PIC) and benefit sharing agreements?
How should association between TK, genetic resources and the invention be
determined? What should be the penalty for non-compliance? 233 A mandatory
disclosure requirement that includes the obligation to disclose PIC and benefit sharing
agreements is advocated in this paper. A mandatory disclosure requirement is
necessary because if patent applicants are allowed to disclose voluntarily the origin of
TK, users that engage in intentional acts of bio piracy will not come forward and reveal
their source of TK. A voluntary disclosure requirement, therefore, will have little effect
in encouraging TK holders to invest in codification. Furthermore, a requirement that
includes disclosure of PIC and benefit sharing will empower source countries and
communities by giving them a much-needed bargaining power in their relationship
with users. TK holders require some form of control over their codified TK. A
include information on the geographical origin of such material, if known; whereas this is without
prejudice to the processing of patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted
patents;” Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, EU BIOTECHNOLOGY DIRECTIVE (30 July 1998).
227 Medaglia, supra note 222, at 3.
228 Disclosure of Origin or Source of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in
Patent Applications, at 6 Annex.
229 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 52, at art. 16 (d, ii), 53 (b).
230 Alison L Hoare & Richard G Tarasofsky, Asking and Telling: Can ‘Disclosure of Origin’
Requirements in Patent Applications Make a Difference?, 10:2 J WORLD INTELLECT PROP 149, 148 &
151 (2007).
231 Id. at 148.
232 Margo Bagley, Of disclosure ‘straws’ and IP system ‘camels’: Patents, innovation, and the
disclosure of origin requirements, in Daniel F. Robinson, Ahmed Abdel-Latif and Pedro Roffe,
PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, at 87
(2017).
233 Medaglia, supra note 222, at 3.
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disclosure requirement that includes evidence of PIC and benefit sharing would enable
TK holders to assert such control.
In a research report on behalf of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), Joshua Sarnoff and Carlos Correa provide a helpful
commentary on what issues should trigger the obligation under the disclosure of origin
requirement. 234 They suggest the adoption of a broad substantive trigger which
considers the “many types of inputs into the process of discovery of and application for
the subject matter.” 235 However, deciding which types of uses should trigger the
disclosure of origin requirement is no easy task. A single invention could, and usually
does, benefit from numerous pieces of information and it could rely on such information
to varying degrees, which creates challenges for the enforcement of the disclosure of
origin requirement. The EU’s position is that disclosure of TK should be required only
when the patent applicant relied directly on such TK to develop the invention in
question. 236 However, excluding situations in which inventors rely on TK indirectly
from the disclosure requirement, may discourage TK holders from investing in
codification by excluding a considerable portion of the relationship between TK holders
and users. A more robust tool may be the ‘substantial reliance’ test adopted by William
Fisher, in which patent applicants will be required to disclose the origin of TK if they
relied, to a substantial degree, on such resource in the inventive process. 237
‘Substantial reliance’ is, however, a vague term in itself and, as Fisher himself
acknowledges, will have to be interpreted by courts through litigation. 238
Sarnoff and Correa also provide some options for measures that could be adopted
to incentivize compliance. These measures could be mixed to meet the policy objective
of a particular jurisdiction. They include
(a) Curable or incurable, temporary or permanent bars to the processing of
applications;
(b) Administrative fines, civil liability or criminal penalties;
(c) Termination, or full or partial transfer of entitlements to apply for or own
intellectual property;
(d) Curable or incurable, temporary or permanent, full or partial
unenforceability, revocation, narrowing of the subject matter, or invalidation
of granted intellectual property;
(e) Return or transfer of benefits received from intellectual property; and
(f) Enforcement of existing or new obligations that provide for equitable benefitsharing. 239
The particular measure that should be adopted to encourage compliance should
generally be left to countries to decide. Since remedies depend highly on the type of
234 Joshua D Sarnoff & Carlos M Correa, Analysis of Options for Implementing Disclosure of
Origin Requirements in Intellectual Property Applications, New York and Geneva: United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, ix–xi (2006).
235 Id. at ix.
236 Disclosure of Origin or Source of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge in
Patent Applications supra note 228, at 6 Annex.
237 William Fisher, Two Thoughts About Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 131,
(2007).
238 Id. at 133.
239 Sarnoff & Correa, supra note 234, at xi.
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legal system and the overall legal environment in each jurisdiction, this is an issue
better left to be addressed by each country. However, it may be helpful to provide some
minimum requirements so that TK holders will have some remedy to leverage, which
could encourage investment in TK codification and disclosure. This may be
‘facultative’ measures that could respond to the actions of the patent applicant and
could include temporary suspension for simple violations to patent revocation for the
most egregious violations. 240 Given the comprehensive nature and effectiveness of the
TRIPs Agreement, amendment of the instrument to include a mandatory disclosure of
origin requirement would be the best tool to establish an effective international system
of TK protection. 241
The disclosure of origin requirements fits well with the thesis that TK protection
should focus on codification and disclosure. One of the key challenges in the disclosure
of origin requirement is the costs associated with such obligation and the burden that
it will create for both administrative agencies and patent applicants. 242 Codified and
accessible TK can be expected to reduce such costs involved in disclosure given the
systematic documentation of TK and the ease of access enabled by domestic legal
protection. Furthermore, investments from the private sector are essential to
complement other means of support for TK codification and disclosure. If the
disclosure of origin requirement is adopted, private actors such as biopharmaceutical
firms that anticipate using TK from a certain region would be incentivized to support
TK codification and disclosure efforts. A mandatory disclosure requirement that
includes a requirement providing that PIC and benefit sharing requirements have
been met, will strongly encourage TK holders to invest in TK codification and
disclosure. TK holders will have the confidence that they will be able to share in the
profits that may result from use of their codified TK by outsiders.
In addition to the ‘disclosure of origin’ requirement, there has been a proposal to
have international instruments recognize national laws of source countries in relation
to TK. 243 Because of the originality of the proposal, a detailed discussion of such
proposal seems necessary. Although the proposal has not been included in the Draft
Articles, if it is accepted into an international treaty, it has the potential to provide an
effective solution to the challenges created by the territoriality of TK protection
mechanisms, without disrupting the international IP system. The proposal is
discussed further below.
C. International Recognition of National Laws
As highlighted in the previous sections, one of the core disputes on the
international protection of TK is determining which issues to address through an
international treaty and which to leave for domestic jurisdictions to address. William
Fisher argues that an international regime is not the answer. 244 He instead proposes
Id.
Field & Fisher, supra note 209, at 256; Sarnoff & Correa, supra note 234, at v.
242 Sarnoff & Correa, supra note 234, at xiii.
243 Fisher, supra note 237.
244 See generally Fisher, supra note 237.
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the insertion of a simple but potentially effective provision to the TRIPs Agreement
that would protect TK at the international level. 245 Fisher proposes the insertion of the
following provision to the TRIPs Agreement:
It shall be a defense to a claim of patent infringement that the inventor(s), in
developing the protected product or process, relied substantially upon
materials or knowledge taken from a member country in violation of that
country’s laws. 246
The brilliance of such an insertion is in its effect of giving back the power of
regulating the use of TK to the source country. Since most mega diverse countries (and
those that are net exporters of TK) have either already created systems of protection
for TK, 247 or are in the process of doing so, the insertion of such a provision in the
TRIPs agreement would cover most of the TK available globally. A common feature of
these domestic laws in source countries is the requirement of the prior informed
consent of a local government agency or knowledge holding community. 248 Most of
these laws also have requirements for benefit-sharing with source communities. 249
Therefore, if the above provision is successfully inserted into the TRIPs agreement (or
any other relevant agreement), it has the potential for addressing TK protection at the
international level without the need for an independent agreement.
The other effective feature of this provision is that it would “give the local laws
teeth, not by penalizing violations directly, but by exposing violators to the
economically devastating sanction of the forfeiture of their own intellectual-property
rights.” 250 Under such a system, a patent right will not be invalidated for violating the
domestic law of a country from the source of TK. The effect of the provision arises when
a patent holder brings a patent infringement lawsuit against a defendant. 251 The
defendant can show, as an affirmative defense, the patentee violated the domestic law
of the country from which the patentee received TK, which directly or indirectly helped
in the making of the invention. 252 The framework will use the considerable power of
private incentives of defendants to make such a tool work effectively.
Fisher’s proposal for amendment of the TRIPs agreement by inserting provisions
that recognize domestic laws of source countries can be effective for TK protection. The
risk of extra-territorial free-riding will be greatly reduced if domestic legal protection
exists in source countries while such framework is recognized under an effective
Id.; Field & Fisher, supra note 209, at 256.
Fisher, supra note 237, at 132.
247 For an updated list of domestic legislations on traditional knowledge curated by WIPO, See
Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Traditional Knowledge Laws, TRADIT.
KNOWL.
TRADIT.
CULT
EXPR.
GENET.
RESOUR.
LAWS,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/tklaws/search_result.jsp?subject=tk&issue=&country=
(last
visited Sep, 7, 2017); For analysis of existing TK protection in domestic legal systems, see Secretariat
of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Comparative Summary of Existing National Sui
Generis Measures and Laws for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge (2003).
248 World Intellectual Property Organization, Disclosure Requirements Table, supra note 225.
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international instrument. Users will be required to comply with domestic frameworks
in order to enforce their patents against potential infringers. The risk of losing the
exclusivity of a patent right will encourage patent applicants to make sure that they
have fulfilled the PIC and fair and equitable benefit-sharing requirements under the
domestic system.
However, Fisher’s proposal is not without its challenges. A key challenge relates
to the burden of proof. How would one decide if a patent applicant accessed TK from
a particular source community as opposed to developing it herself or accessing it from
another source community? How will the patent applicant know if she can fend off
claims from source communities from which she accessed their TK? This complicates
Fisher’s proposal which, on its face, looks easy to implement. Yet, while these
challenging questions make the proposed solution complicated, they do not make it
ineffective. Evidentiary standards that apply in these situations could be developed
through the TRIPs dispute resolution mechanism. 253
Nuno Pires de Carvalho proposed a framework that resembles the insertion that
Fisher suggested. 254 By citing US case law as an example, Carvalho identifies the
application of the ‘unclean hands doctrine’ 255 in patent law in which a patentee who
has abused his/her IP right or who has been fraudulent cannot seek relief from a court
or similar entity until such abuse or fraud is addressed. 256 This doctrine resembles the
disclosure of origin requirement discussed in the previous section. Carvalho argues
that the concealment of the use of TK in the development of an invention in patent
applications could be declared as an abuse of IP rights under an international treaty. 257
The effect of a patent right obtained through unclean hands is the temporary
suspension of the right of the patentee to seek redress against potential infringers.
Once the patentee ‘cleans’ his/her hand by disclosing the origin of TK, he/she is able to
bring lawsuits against infringers. Carvalho’s proposal is made in the context of the
defensive protection of TK. 258 This application of the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine is similar
to some of the forms in which the disclosure of origin requirement could be adopted.
Carvalho’s proposal would result in an effective positive protection if it also obligates
patent applicants to fulfill PIC and benefit sharing obligations found in the laws of
source countries.
If source countries adopt legislation that gives rights over TK, the adoption of the
‘unclean hands doctrine’ or the insertion of the provision proposed above by Fisher may
be a good starting point from which to establish a workable global framework of TK
protection. If a treaty recognizes positive rights of knowledge holder communities in
The author is grateful for comments from Rochelle Dreyfuss through which these questions
were raised.
254 Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and Prior
Informed Consent in Patent Applications wihtout Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The Problem and
the Solution, 2 WASH UNIV. J LAW POLICY 375, 399–400 (2000).
255 For a general discussion of the unclean hands doctrine as it applies in IP law, see Daniel
Markel, Can Intellectual Property Law Regulate Behavior? A ‘Modest Proposal’ for Weakening Unclean
Hands, 113:6 HARV. LAW REV. 1503 (2000).
256 Carvalho, supra note 254, at 399–400.
257 Carvalho, supra note 182, at 256.
258 Defensive protection of TK is the prevention of users from receiving patent rights for
inventions that have relied directly or indirectly on TK. It is contrasted to positive protection in which
knowledge providers receive positive rights in their TK.
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their codified TK, and a user violates such rights and later claims patent rights in a
country that is a member of such treaty, then the patentee will be exposing the patent
to an effective defense.
There are a few challenges that such frameworks may face. One challenge may
be in convincing developed countries in which most users reside to agree to such a
mechanism. If the amendment or insertion is made in the TRIPs Agreement as
proposed by Fisher, then the full force of the TRIPs Agreement will enable the
emergence of an effective TK protection system at the international level, with the
WTO dispute settlement regime available to ensure compliance. Another challenge
relates to the inability or resistance of domestic courts to interpret and apply the laws
of another country. Imagine for instance the case where New Zealand had a TK
protection regime for the Maori 259 based on the government’s understanding of the
community. Under an international regime with a national treatment requirement, a
community from another country is expected to have the same protection in New
Zealand as the Maori. The San people in South Africa could claim rights in New
Zealand. In this scenario, a court in New Zealand will have to understand the rules
(formal or customary) under which the San people operate. Understandably, the court
in New Zealand may not be comfortable in interpreting and applying the formal or
customary rules of the San people.
However, this challenge is not unique to TK protection. The field of conflict of law
deals with many areas of law in which domestic courts of one country are asked to
interpret and apply the laws of another jurisdiction. Similarly, if source communities
are able to make declarations regarding the rules under which they operate, and if
source countries make their domestic legislations easily accessible, then the country
applying the proposed standards could apply a ‘conflict-of-laws’ type of approach to
address the challenge.
To sum up this section, there is a need for an international TK protection system
to strike a balance between providing effective protection for TK with sufficient
flexibility for signatories to define what form TK protection will take in their domestic
jurisdictions. A combination of some substantive minima with the basic principles of
national treatment and MFN treatment may be capable of establishing such balance.
A key substantive minimum is the requirement of a disclosure of origin that includes
the requirement of fulfilling PIC and benefit-sharing conditions of source countries.
As a complementary measure, the recognition of domestic laws of source countries
could be introduced in the TRIPs Agreement or another relevant international
instrument in order to address the challenges of the territoriality of TK protection
under domestic jurisdictions.
Now that the possible options for international TK protection have been analyzed,
the following section will address the latest trend in international TK protection –
bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements. Following the general trend
of countries utilizing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms rather than multilateral
negotiation to address global trade, proponents of TK protection have attempted to
insert provisions on TK protection into bilateral investment treaties and free trade
agreements. The following section examines the impact of using such instruments to
protect TK and its potential effect in encouraging the codification and disclosure of
such knowledge.
259
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D. Protection Through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
The latest development in the international movement to protect TK seems to lie
in the realm of bilateral/multilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements. 260
Global Affairs Canada 261 recently researched the recent trend of including TK related
provisions (among others) in free trade agreements (FTAs). 262 This resulted in a report
on nearly 70 FTAs signed between countries that may be expected to have such
provisions in their FTAs. 263 Close to half of the FTAs examined included provisions
regarding TK while the rest made no mention of them. 264 The FTAs that include TK
provisions tend to be the most recent ones, a development which shows that the
practice of inserting TK protection into FTAs is trending upwards. 265 FTAs signed
between 2013 and 2015 (the last year the study covered) are most likely to have TK
provisions. The ‘non-exhaustive compendium’ of FTAs shows that most of these TK
provisions are included in the intellectual property chapters of the agreements, while
some are in the environmental chapter, in other chapters, in MOUs or letters of
understanding. 266
This trend seems to be an adoption of a similar trend in international IP law in
which obligations under the TRIPs agreement have been expanded through FTAs. The
trend in the use of FTAs seems to be a forum shifting strategy used by the US and EU
to heighten intellectual property protection globally. 267 Forum shifting (regime
shifting) is a strategy in which a country or a group of like-minded countries changes
the forum in which an issue is being considered, and where progress is not to its
satisfaction, to one which it expects will fulfill their interests. 268 The result of forum
shifting in the IP realm is a TRIPs-plus regime in which many countries in the world
now provide more protection than is required under the TRIPs Agreement.
Some scholars have criticized the use of FTAs to create an international norm. A
core criticism is that FTAs are used by powerful countries to bypass multilateral
negotiation forums in order to create global norms that most other countries would not
accept. 269 In multilateral negotiations, countries with less bargaining power can form
a coalition of like-minded countries in order to challenge more powerful actors to
Frankel, supra note 98.
Formerly ‘Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada’.
262 Global Affairs Canada, Non-Exhaustive Compendium of the Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions Provisions found in Free Trade Agreements.
(Unpublished) (Copy with author).
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 See generally id.
267 See generally Susy Frankel, Challenging Trips-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of NonViolation Disputes, 12:4 J INT. ECON LAW 1023 (2009).
268 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, EDS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
269 JAGDISH N BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM : HOW PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS
UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 72 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); See generally PEDRO ROFFE
& CHRISTOPH SPENNEMANN, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (Mario Cimoli et al, eds, Intellect Prop Rights Leg Econ Chall Dev., Oxford University Press,
2014); DANIEL J GERVAIS & SUSY FRANKEL, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 128 (Edward Elgar Pub, 2015); Frankel, supra note 267, at 1039.
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establish fair international standards acceptable by the majority of members. In
bilateral and multilateral agreements, this power is greatly reduced, and developing
countries usually end up giving in to the demands of more powerful states. 270 Although
it has been understood that forum shifting is a practice used by powerful states and
most frequently by the US, 271 Laurence Helfner has argued that the advocates of
international TK protection may have also used a forum shifting strategy in shifting,
from TRIPs, to biodiversity and human rights forums in order to ensure the recognition
of TK in international instruments. 272 By further moving TK protection discussions
into FTAs, developing countries may be attempting to yet again shift regimes in order
to create norms and principles that they have been advocated unsuccessfully in other
forums. Given the increase in the use of FTAs to further trade and IP policy, the
question remains if the demandeurs of international TK protection, which are usually
countries with weaker bargaining power, can use FTAs to further their cause.
This is the question that Susy Frankel responds to in her 2012 publication,
“Attempts to Protect Indigenous Culture through Free Trade Agreements.” 273 Frankel
finds that the demandeurs of international TK protection are not using FTAs to
establish norms around TK protection. She finds, rather, that TK provisions in FTAs
that have them “purport[ing] to reserve the right of the parties to protect [TK] or they
have mere aspirational statements about the parties agreeing to discuss the protection
of [TK].” 274 Such vague and general terms will not be able to establish norms regarding
the international protection of TK. 275 To date, lead demandeurs of international TK
protection such as India, South Africa, and Egypt have not included TK provisions in
their FTAs. 276
In some instances, the demandeurs of international TK protection actually agree
to terms that undo the progress made on the IGC front by giving into the position of a
more powerful party. 277 The FTAs signed by Peru with other countries is a prime
example of this. 278 Among the countries included in the Global Affairs Canada
research, Peru stood out as a leader in having TK provisions included in FTAs. 279 In
fact, Peru’s FTA with the European Free Trade Association has one of the strongest

270 See generally CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 11-12 (Penang, Malaysia: Zed

Books, 2000).
271 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 268, at 565.
272 Helfner Laurence, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Law Making, 29 YALE J INT. LAW 1, 46 & 55 (2004).
273 Frankel, supra note 98.
274 Id. at 127.
275 Hans Morten Haugen, How Are Indigenous and Local Communities’ Rights Over Their
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources Protected in Current Free Trade Negotiations?
Highlighting the Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TTPA), 17:3–4 J WORLD INTELLECT.
PROP. 81, 91 (2014).
276 Global Affairs Canada, supra note 237; Email communication with Nadine Nicker, Senior
Trade Policy Officer, Intellectual Property Trade Policy Division (TMI), Global Affairs Canada. Nadine
Nickner, FOLLOW UP (2015).
277 Frankel, supra note 98, at 127.
278 See FTAs signed by Peru, Global Affairs Canada, supra note 262.
279 Id.

[17:42 2017]

The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge:
Searching for the Minimum Consensus

86

requirements on disclosure of the origins of TK in patent applications. 280 However, in
the FTA Peru signed with the United States, the memorandum of understanding on
TK states that the parties agree that TK protection “can be adequately addressed
through contracts.” 281 This position is the same the United States took in discussions
of TK protection through WTO’s TRIPs agreement. 282 Peru’s strong advocacy for TK
protection, which is reflected in FTAs it has with other countries and in other
international forums, is not reflected in its MOU with the US. This example of the
Peru-USA FTA might be evidence of how weaker countries can be more disadvantaged
under bilateral agreements than in multilateral settings.
However, what is more striking is that some FTAs between demandeurs of
international TK protection have also failed to provide strong norm-setting provisions
on TK protection. 283 This is the case even if both sides of the FTA have commonalities
in TK protection domestically. 284 This is the case, for instance, with the Peru-China
FTA. 285 The wordings in these FTAs are aspirational or permissive at best. These
scenarios speak to a missed opportunity that demandeurs of TK protection have to
further entrench the international norms surrounding TK protection being developed
at the IGC. 286 Although limited in their impact, TK protection norms included in FTAs
between demandeurs of TK protection, have the potential to influence multilateral
deliberations.
1. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
The dynamics between countries with different bargaining power under FTAs can
also be seen in the difference between one of the latest and most controversial
agreements – the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 287 and its precursor
agreement, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership. 288 The initial, signed
agreement, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, started between
Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand. It included a permissive but clear
statement on TK protection. The agreements under its Chapter 10, Article 10.3 states:
“The Parties, in accordance with their national laws, shall provide for administrative, civil or
criminal sanctions if the inventor or the patent applicant wilfully make a wrongful or misleading
declaration of the origin or source. The judge may order the publication of the ruling.” Free Trade
Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the European Free Trade Agreements (EFTA) States, Art.
6.5 (6) (2010); Email communication with Nadine Nicker, Senior Trade Policy Officer, Intellectual
Property Trade Policy Division (TMI), Global Affairs Canada. Nickner, supra note 276.
281 The United States - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Memorandum of Understanding
Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (2006).
282 Frankel, supra note 98, at 128.
283 Many of the FTAs signed by Peru and India with other Asian and Latin American countries
do not have TK protection at all. Some of the FTAs that have TK protection have general statements
that are not able to qualify as norm-setting. Global Affairs Canada, supra note 262.
284 Frankel, supra note 98, at 129.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 133.
287 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (2016). Member countries of the agreement are:
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, United States of America and Vietnam.
288 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (2005).
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“Subject to each Party’s international obligations the Parties affirm that they may: …
(d) establish appropriate measures to protect traditional knowledge.” 289 More
important, the founding countries of the agreement included TK in their definition of
“creative arts.” 290 This may be an example of a ‘legal innovation’ 291 in which countries
favorable to TK protection are attempting to use FTAs to re-define key international
IP terms in the absence of powerful states objecting to TK protection. Given this
background, the changes in the later agreement – the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which includes more powerful states such as the US, Japan, Australia and Canada shows a shift towards weaker and generalized statements on TK protection. 292
The TPP addresses TK in two different chapters: its intellectual property chapter
(Chapter 18) and environmental chapter (Chapter 20). 293 It has been noted that the
United States and Japan were against the inclusion of statements on TK protection
under the IP chapter. 294 This may arguably be a strategy used by the US and Japan
(countries that are usually against strong TK protection) to avoid the inclusion of TK
as intellectual property independent of genetic resources. TK relevant for the
conservation of biodiversity and genetic resources is a subject covered under the
CBD. 295 The WIPO IGC forum deliberates on TK protection as a stand-alone issue. If,
as the US and Japan wanted TK protection to become excluded from the IP chapter,
TK would not be discussed as an independent intellectual property issue at the WIPO
IGC. TK discussion would have been exclusively on TK that is relevant for biodiversity
conservation, as is the case under the CBD framework. As discussed below, the final
wording of the provisions of the IP chapter still avoids using the term TK
independently.
The TPP Article 18.16 descriptively titled “Cooperation in the Area of Traditional
Knowledge” has three sub-articles, two of which make very general statements about
TK. 296 The first sub-article states that signatories “recognise the relevance of
intellectual property systems and traditional knowledge associated with genetic
resources […]” while the second sub-article states that “Parties shall endeavour to
cooperate […] to enhance the understanding of issues connected with traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources [...]” 297 These provisions do not commit
signatories to any particularly enforceable obligation, nor do they include any of the
basic principles being discussed at the WIPO IGC. The basic principles of prior
informed consent and access and benefit sharing have not been recognized. Despite
the focus of the third sub-article on increasing the ‘quality of patent examination,’ it
Id. at Ch. 10, Art. 10.3 (d).
See id. at note accompanying Ch. 19, Art. 19.1 (3). It should be noted that the definition
provided focuses on literary and artistic fields which are different from the definition of TK provided
in this paper. However, given the interest of advocates of TK protection to define TK holistically, the
definition used in this agreement may still apply to TK as defined in this paper.
291 Ruth Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: Revisiting
Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36:1 UNIV. PA J INT. LAW 191, 195 (2014).
292 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 287.
293 See Id. at Ch. 18 & Ch. 20.
294 Haugen, supra note 275, at 81.
295 See generally CONVENTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 56.
296 The third sub-article simple focuses on defensive protection of TK by increasing the quality of
patent examinations through increased access to TK.
297 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, at Ch. 18, Art. 18.16.
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does not require patent applicants to disclose information regarding any TK used in
the development of the invention. 298 The IP chapter has avoided mentioning all major
principles being considered under international TK protection. 299
In fact, given that TK is mentioned only as it relates to genetic resources, the
provisions seem to refer to the general obligations under the CBD and completely
neglect the IGC deliberations on TK protection independent of genetic resources. In
addition to the weakness of these provisions, cooperation on any issue in the chapter
is based on the “availability of resources, and on request, and on terms and conditions
mutually agreed upon between the Parties involved.” 300 Since the article on TK calls
for ‘cooperation’ on the issue, all of the statements are conditional on this provision,
further weakening any statement made about TK protection.
The TK discussions under the environmental section are similar to those in the
IP chapter. 301 Article 20.13 of the chapter titled ‘Trade and Biodiversity’ mostly focuses
on genetic resources. 302 Sub-article 3 of the same article states:
The Parties recognise the importance of respecting, preserving and
maintaining knowledge and practices of indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional lifestyles that contribute to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. 303 (Emphasis added).
The quoted text does not say anything about ‘protection’ of TK as parties only
agreed to recognize the need to ‘respect, preserve and maintain’ TK. This provision is
almost identical to Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). 304 However,
the CBD provision goes on to state that the parties agree to promote access and benefit
sharing with indigenous peoples and local communities while the TPP’s version has a
much-weakened version of the commitment focusing only on genetic resources. 305
Overall, the TK provisions in both the IP and environment chapters of the TPP do not
contain any clear commitments or obligations. They also do not recognize the advanced
deliberations at the WIPO IGC on TK protection as an independent subject matter.
The history of the negotiating dynamics of the TPP could be seen from leaked text
of earlier versions of the TPP. 306 Peru, Malaysia, Mexico and Brunei proposed strong
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, at Ch. 18 (2016).
See generally id.
300 Id. at Ch. 18, Art. 18.17.
301 See Id. at Ch. 20.
302 Id. at Ch. 20, Art. 20.13.
303 Id.
304 Handbook of The Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 56, at 138.
305 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, at Ch. 20, Art. 20.13 (4) note 217; “The Parties recognize
the importance of facilitating access to genetic resources within their respective national jurisdictions,
consistent with each Party’s international obligations. The Parties further recognize that some Parties
require, through national measures, prior informed consent to access such genetic resources in
accordance with national measures and, where such access is granted, the establishment of mutually
agreed terms, including with respect to sharing of benefits from the use of such genetic resources,
between users and providers.” (Emphasis added).
306 See WikiLeaks Release of Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): Advanced
Intellectual Property Chapter for All 12 Nations with Negotiating Positions, WIKILEAKS, Art. QQ.E.23
(2013).
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obligatory and detailed commitments in earlier versions of the TPP agreement, while
countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have opposed the use of such
terms and preferred more permissive statements. 307 The general divide discussed in
the earlier section between the positions of developing countries that hold considerable
TK within their jurisdiction, and developed countries where most users reside, is seen
in these negotiating documents. Given the highly qualified, non-obligatory and
general statements on TK protection in the final text, it can be concluded that more
powerful/developed countries have succeeded in restricting TK protection to a more
aspirational and optional framework.
Although there have been several missed opportunities, analysis of the most
recent FTAs shows that there might be an upward trend. Examination of a
compendium of close to 70 FTAs prepared by Global Affairs Canada reveals that most
of the leading countries that have pushed for TK protection globally have managed to
insert TK related provisions into FTAs. 308 This trend is seen especially in FTAs signed
between 2013 and 2015, thus demonstrating a growing trend. For instance, the 2013
FTA between EU, Peru, and Colombia contains the most extensive commitment among
the FTAs analyzed. 309 While TK protection is discussed in both the environmental
section and the intellectual property section, the provisions explicitly cite the rights
and obligations of the parties to the CBD and other international forums. The
provision’s relatively strong statements on the basic principles of ‘prior informed
consent’ and ‘benefit sharing’ have been discussed in other forums. On other more
recent FTAs, China has shown increasing success in inserting TK provisions into its
FTAs, including those with Switzerland 310 and South Korea (2015), 311 which expressly
recognizes the above mentioned basic principles. 312 One conclusion that may be drawn
from this trend may be that advocates of TK protection are finally realizing the
potential of FTAs as norm-setting tools on a global level and have begun using them
as such. However, since the practice is very recent, the actual impact of this trend
remains uncertain.
A useful comparison to the TPP is an FTA, thought by many to be an alternative
to the TPP – The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 313 The

See id.; proposals and objections.
Global Affairs Canada, supra note 262.
309 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Colombia and Peru, of the other part, at Art. 201 & 271 (2012).
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Art. 11.9.
311 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Korea, at Art. 15.17.
312 Notably, China’s FTA with Australia (2015) (which was signed at the same time as its FTAs
with Switzerland and South Korea) only has aspirational statements which shows that it is also
finding it hard to negotiate the inclusion of strong TK protection norms in FTA agreements with an
economically developed country. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, at Art. 11.17.
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RCEP has 16 member countries including China, but excluding the US. 314 The leaked
text of the IP chapter in the RCEP shows strong substantive provisions on TK
protection. 315 Although the RCEP is still being negotiated, if the final text manages to
include most parts of the current provisions, it will set a much stronger standard of
TK protection than that set by the TPP.
To summarize the above discussion, although FTAs are not the ideal route to the
creation of international norms, for one reason or another, there is a proliferation of
such agreements. FTAs are being signed by states in varying stages of economic
development. Each member of the WTO is thought to be a signatory to an average of
13 FTAs. 316 Given that they have become ubiquitous, the demandeurs of international
TK protection should start using FTAs strategically to build norms around basic
principles that signatories would accept. 317 A promising trend is that the general value
of TK is increasingly being recognized in many instruments and forums. 318 Many FTA
side letters (which are used as commitments between parties to continue deliberating
on certain issues for the future), including some TPP side letters, deal with TK
protection. 319 Perhaps this is the beginning of the development of global norms on TK
protection through FTAs. Delegates should build on general points of agreement in
order to reach acceptable solutions. As discussed above, the alarming rate of TK loss
and the need to establish legal frameworks that encourage its codification and
disclosure should be the organizing principles in such endeavor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The risk of extra-territorial free-riding suggests the need for an international TK
protection mechanism. Although some domestic measures such as secrecy and
deferred disclosure could mitigate the effect of free-riding, they limit the dissemination
of TK resulting in inefficiencies. The full potential of the legal framework will be
realized only when there is an international TK protection mechanism.
This paper examined the status quo in terms of relevant international fora that
have implications for TK protection with emphasis on the WIPO, CBD and WTO. It
also examined the most advanced instrument on TK protection – the Draft Articles of
the WIPO IGC. Although international TK protection has been discussed for over a
decade, a clear and enforceable regime of protection has yet to be achieved.
International deliberations at the WIPO IGC are stalled because of the failure of
314 Currently, the member countries of the RCEP are the 10 ASEAN countries and China, India,
Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.
315 See section 7 of the intellectual property chapter. Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) (Leaked IP Chapter) (Knowledge Ecology International).
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Trading System, 16:1 J WORLD INVEST. AMP. TRADE 122, 131 (2015).
317 See generally Frankel, supra note 98.
318 Haugen, supra note 275, at 92.
319 See Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (The Government of
Canada and the Government of Malaysia); Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and Traditional
Knowledge (The Governments of Canada and of the Republic of Peru); Bilateral Understanding
between the U.S. and Peru on Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge; Understanding Regarding
Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge (The Governments of New Zealand and the Republic of Peru),
SIDE LETTERS OF THE TPP (2016).
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delegates to agree on several key issues. These issues include the definition/scope of
TK, the legal nature of the proposed instrument, the tension between providing
flexibilities for domestic policy space and crafting an effective/enforceable system of
protection, and the relationship between the proposed instrument and other
international agreements. Negotiations are ongoing at the WIPO IGC despite these
differences in negotiating positions.
The feasible way forward for international TK protection seems to lie in striking
the right balance between providing flexibilities for domestic jurisdictions to craft
domestic laws based on a country’s needs and capabilities, and ensuring that there is
a sufficient international obligation that would encourage the codification and
disclosure of TK. Such a framework should begin with the minimum consensus among
key stakeholders, including major source countries and jurisdictions in which most
users interested in access to TK reside.
In order to guide the development of such consensus and to strike a balance
between flexibility and enforceability, it is proposed that the Draft Articles include five
provisions on the following issues: A provision defining TK and the general subject
matter that should be subject to protection (currently included in Article 1 of the Draft
Articles), a new article requiring the establishment of domestic frameworks that would
encourage the codification and disclosure of TK through databases/registries, an
article setting out enforcement measures (Article 4), provisions on national treatment
and MFN treatment (Article 11), and a provision on the relationship of the instrument
to other international agreements (Article 10). The international instrument should
be limited to these few provisions and it should leave the details of the system for
domestic laws.
While diplomatic negotiations are painfully slow, scholars have advanced several
proposals that seek to provide innovative legal tools to protect TK. The paper has
examined the feasibility of some of the most promising proposals. The establishment
of a mandatory disclosure of origin requirement that includes obligations to disclose
‘prior informed consent’ and enforceable benefit sharing agreements will be a key legal
tool to provide effective international TK protection. Additionally, the recognition of
national legislation under international agreements seems to have potential for
establishing an effective form of international protection if the relevant international
agreements such as TRIPs are amended to include such provisions. The basic
principles of national treatment and most favored nation treatment borrowed from
international IP law are also needed in order to supplement minimum substantive
protection.
Because of the lack of progress in multilateral regimes including that at the WIPO
IGC, some demandeurs of international TK protection have begun using FTAs to
further the international dialogue on TK protection. Although FTAs are not the ideal
tool for establishing global norms, given that they are proliferating, countries
advocating for TK protection should begin to use them strategically to establish global
norms of TK protection. Although most demandeurs of TK protection do not have the
bargaining power to influence more powerful countries, they could begin by inserting
TK protection provisions into FTAs between two or more like-minded countries. In all
of these efforts, it is suggested that the need to encourage the codification and
disclosure of TK should be the organizing principle. Since this need has been endorsed
in many instruments, including the WIPO Draft Articles, it should be possible to
develop a global norm around such principles.

